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ABSTRACT 
     
From the use of manual payment systems in the delivery of social cash 
transfers, most developing nations nowadays are resorting to electronic 
payment solutions to improve the timeliness and effective delivery of the 
social grants amidst programme scale ups. Like most countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Zambia recently introduced an electronic delivery system through a 
commercial bank (ZANACO) and within two years, the Zambia Postal 
Services Corporation (ZAMPOST) was also engaged as an alternative 
payment solution for the Social Cash Transfer programme. Zambia’s manual 
system was designed in such a way that it used teachers or other local civil 
servants to make cash payments as ‘Pay Point Managers’ (PPMs). The system 
also uses Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) to help in the 
identification of eligible beneficiaries and to monitor payments. This manual 
payment system was assessed to have administrative and operational 
weaknesses including corruption and insecurity (because of the physical 
movement of cash from the bank to the pay points), prompting the introduction 
of electronic payment solutions. The e-payment system was introduced 
through ZANACO which is partly owned by the Government and partly 
private. Apart from Lusaka, this channel was slow in scaling up its services to 
other areas prescribed in the contract with the responsible Ministry, the 
Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS), and was 
not very convenient for people with disabilities especially the blind and older 
persons not used to Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and pre-paid cards. 
ZAMPOST was subsequently engaged to cover two provinces with the aim of 
accelerating e-payment services and improving service delivery of the 
programme. Instead of developing such a system, however, the Post Office 
opted to operate just like the manual system, but instead of using PPMs, it 
opted to use its own employees to physically carry cash to pay points and 
make payments. This system posed several challenges including poor record 
keeping leading to payment of ineligible beneficiaries and failure to produce 
reports. Audit reports revealed grave irregularities with this payment method 
xii 
 
and many stakeholders, including donors were concerned about the poor 
performance of ZAMPOST.  
As a contribution to scholarship in the improvement of delivery systems in 
social protection, this dissertation therefore, highlights the advantages and 
disadvantages of using the manual as well as the electronic delivery systems in 
the delivery of social grants. Through the analysis of the manual payment 
system, e-payment system and the use of the Post Office in Zambia, I 
investigate how delivery systems are identified, designed and how they 
function. How they impact on beneficiaries as well as their implication on 
Government policies. I argue for participatory identification and designing of 
delivery systems of social grants.  In addition, I argue that social grants 
delivery systems are largely influenced by global trends, whereby some 
countries adopt what others are using without necessarily considering local 
implications and capacity to sustain; for instance, mimicking electronic 
systems used in economically sound countries in the quest to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of social grants. This study sheds 
light on how Zambia’s social grants have been delivered vis-à-vis structural 
fundamentals, design and stakeholder engagement.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Social Cash Transfers (SCTs) are a major social protection intervention for 
fighting poverty in most developing countries nowadays. According to Catubig 
et al. (2015), providing resources to the most vulnerable groups in society, 
promotes inclusive growth. SCTs are regular non-contributory payments of 
money provided by governments or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
to individuals and households (Samson, 2009, cited by Oberländer and 
Brossman, 2014). These payments are either conditional or unconditional and 
are usually targeted at households or persons fulfilling specific criteria such as 
income poverty or malnutrition (Oberländer and Brossman, 2014).  
Empirical evidence from evaluations of such programmes in developing 
countries has revealed that SCTs can help reduce hunger, poverty, educational 
depravation and improve the health of poor families as well as promote gender 
equality and contribute to people empowerment (Catubig et al., 2015). By 
2010, it was estimated that over 750 million people would be benefiting from 
SCTs in the developing world (Arnold et al., 2011).  
Zambia is among the countries that are implementing SCTs to reduce extreme 
poverty among its people. With an estimated population of 15.5 million people 
(3 million households), 40.8 percent are extremely poor (unable to meet the 
cost of the basic food basket), (LCMS, 2015). The incidence of extreme 
poverty in rural areas is at 60.8 percent. This is 5 times that of urban areas 
which is at 12.8 percent. On the other hand, the moderately poor are estimated 
at 15.8 percent in rural areas and 10.6 percent in urban areas respectively 
(LCMS, 2015). This is despite Zambia being reclassified as a lower middle-
income country in 2011 (World Bank, 2011).  
The poorest province in Zambia is Western Province at 73 percent, followed 
by Luapula and North-Western Provinces at 68 percent each.  Lusaka is the 
least poor at 11 percent (LCMS, 2015). 
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Most rural dwellers depend on agriculture, although access to social amenities 
is a huge challenge (World Bank, 2017). According to Poulinquen (2000), 
there is a correlation between access to basic infrastructure and poverty; 
without affordable transport services in rural areas, people will continue to be 
isolated and wallow in abject poverty. Most of Zambia’s rural transport 
infrastructure is in a deplorable state, which makes it difficult for the 
inhabitants to do business and improve their welfare through agriculture. In the 
rainy season for instance, most access roads and water channels become 
impassable thereby making rural areas inaccessible and livelihood more 
unbearable especially for the extreme poor (Foster and Dominguez, 2010).  
 
Booth et al (2000) contend that well-designed transport policies have the 
potential to uplift the living standards of the poor and contribute to poverty-
reduction. In agreeing with this view, however, this researcher is of the view 
that the poor should also be capacitated to use the transport infrastructure 
productively. One way in which this can be done is by providing social grants 
for the poor (MCDSS, 2017). It is for this reason, therefore, that the 
Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) prioritized Social Protection 
Programmes (SPP), with the Social Cash Transfer Scheme (SCT), being its 
flagship programme (MCDSS, 2018). 
 
At the inception of the SCT programme, beneficiaries in the pilot district were 
asked to open accounts with the Finance Bank which was the only commercial 
bank in Kalomo at the time. All the beneficiaries were to receive their grants 
through the bank. In 2007, however, it was realized that beneficiaries living 
beyond 15 kilometers from the bank were having challenges to receive their 
grants due to distance. As a result, the Bank was relinquished, and pay-point 
officers were introduced (Garcia and Moore, 2012).  
 
The scheme remained with the pay point officers later to be known as Pay 
Point Managers (PPMs), until 2016 when the Ministry introduced alternative 
payment solutions following the scale up of the programme and the Fiduciary 
Risk Assessment (FRA) reports (MCDSS, 2018).  
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There however, seem to be insufficient or no research on the performance of 
the delivery mechanisms of social cash transfers in Zambia. This study, 
therefore, explores the quality, cost effectiveness, client engagement and 
sustainability of the delivery systems in the programme. Lodorfos et al (2015), 
citing Grönroos and Ravald, (2011) admit that delivering services of high 
quality, is an important pursuit for service providers that seek to create and 
provide value to their clients. In order to provide high quality service and 
create value for customer service, organisations should plan the delivery of 
their services effectively (Lodorfos et al, 2015).  
 
It is against this background that this study explored how the social cash 
transfers have been paid in Zambia and what lessons have been generated.  
 
1.1 Background 
 
The Government of Zambia, in its Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), 
(2006 to 2010), prioritised Social Protection as one of its major innovations in 
supporting economic growth, poverty reduction and promotion of equity and 
human rights (CID, 2008). According to CID (2008), the FNDP identified 
programmes such as the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) and 
Social Cash Transfers (SCTs) as innovations with enormous potential to 
reduce extreme poverty in ‘incapacitated’ households, i.e. households headed 
by the elderly, severely disabled, too young or too sick to cope with 
economically challenging situations (MCDSS, 2014).  
 
While the FNDP was engendered by the Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD) Government, it was not until 2013, i.e., two years after the 
Patriotic Front (PF) Government had taken over power (in 2011) that the then 
Finance Minister Alexander Chikwanda (2011 to 2016), announced in 
Parliament that Government would in 2014 increase funding to the SCT 
programme by over 700 percent to make significant impact on the reduction of 
extreme poverty in the country. This dramatic shift was contrary to Ng’andu 
Magande’s position on the SCT scheme (Finance Minister 2003 to 2008 under 
4 
 
the MMD Government), who totally opposed social cash transfers, alleging 
that such innovations were only there to promote laziness and dependency 
culture among the poor (Kabandula and Seekings, 2014).  
 
On the contrary, Chikwanda however, willingly aligned the social protection 
budget and cash transfers, to the PF Party Election Manifesto of 2011, which, 
ascribed to international obligations on social protection such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other similar instruments. The PF 
Manifesto emphasised guaranteed citizens’ access to social protection, 
especially to those who faced challenges in meeting basic needs (PF 
Manifesto, 2011-2016). This resulted in the prioritisation of the development 
of a comprehensive National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) by Government 
though spearheaded by Cooperating Partners (CPs) such as the United Nations 
Children Fund (UNICEF) and others. Further, the PF pledged to establish a 
high-level unit to oversee the implementation of the NSPP under the Cabinet 
Office (PF Manifesto, 2011-2016). By February 2019 though, this had not 
been achieved. To demonstrate its commitment, however, the Government 
(under President Michael Sata), launched the NSPP in 2014. Nonetheless, after 
the demise of President Sata, his successor; President Edgar Chagwa Lungu 
continued with the same vision on social protection, that by February 2019, 
Lungu’s Government made steady progress on the country’s first ever 
National Social Protection Bill (NSPB), to provide a comprehensive and 
integrated institutional framework on social protection in Zambia (ILO, 2017).  
According to ILO (2017), if this was to be accomplished, it would be a 
milestone that would distinguish the PF from the MMD, in regard to social 
protection. While these strides would demonstrate the Government’s 
commitment to social protection, one would still argue that when you consider 
the time it has taken to establish the NSPP Coordinating Unit at Cabinet Office 
as proclaimed in the PF Party Manifesto, the Government has failed to meet its 
obligation. The only notable achievement about legislation in this regard is the 
enactment of the Health Insurance Act, while the Old-Age Pensions and the 
Social Protection Bill still linger in the pipeline. 
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It is, however, worth noting that the PF, through its Election Manifesto of 
2011, had observed that existing pilot projects including SCT were nearly 100 
percent funded by donors. The party was, therefore, cautious about the need to 
reverse this situation to avoid reverting to previous status quo if the money 
was to run out, as such; would be a tragedy. PF, therefore, intended to proceed 
cautiously and encourage partners to do likewise to avoid reversing or scaling-
down an initiative once it was up and running (PF Manifesto, 2011-2016, 
p.21).  
As the Social Protection Bill remained in the pipeline, it was not clear how 
programmes such as SCTs would be sustained amidst several other competing 
priorities. What was apparent, however, was that emphasis had already been 
made on the scaling up of the programme through budgetary allocations, 
though not necessarily stressing delivery mechanisms as seen from this 
funding pattern: ZMW41.6 million in 2011 to ZMW 43.9 million in 2012, to 
ZMW 89.7 million in 2013 and to ZMW 196.2 million in 2014, an increase of 
45.4 percent within a short space of time (MCDSS, 2014).  
In 2016, the PF reaffirmed its commitment to SCT by pledging another 
increase to the programme’s budgetary allocation (PF Manifesto 2016-2021, p. 
39).  
According to Siachiwena (2016), by the end of 2014, the PF Government had 
83,000 more SCT beneficiary households than were targeted by the MMD 
Government in the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP). The expansion 
of cash transfers continued in 2015 resulting in 107,000 more beneficiary 
households than were projected by the previous government for the same 
period. It appears successive governments were reluctant to expand the cash 
transfer programmes that were initiated on pilot basis by donors (Seekings, 
2016).  
According to Seekings (2016), the MMD Government in particular, resisted 
cash transfers on grounds of unaffordability, but the change of government in 
2011 saw a mission drift toward policy reforms, although, limited reforms 
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were achieved due to financial limitations on national treasuries and the 
hostility on what was perceived to be ‘handouts.’  
While the rollout of the programme could also be attributed to the evidence of 
success from various evaluation reports especially those done by partners such 
as UNICEF, GTZ and the American Research Institute between 2007 and 
2012 (MCDSS, 2018). Nkhoma (2018) however, observes that sometimes 
such evidence can be manipulated to propagate the interests of those driving 
the agenda, especially politicians. It is however, worth noting that before the 
launch of the NSPP, the estimated costs for the SCT programme ranged from 
only $11 to $42 million, representing 0.5 percent of GRZ National budget 
(CID, 2008). When the NSPP was launched, the budgetary allocation went up 
rapidly as seen in Table 1 and Figure 1 below.  The rise in budgetary 
allocation to SCT also led to the increase in the number of beneficiary 
households and rollout to more districts. This also meant establishing new pay 
points, new Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) and 
appointment of new Pay Point Managers (PPMs) thereby increasing 
administration cost of the programme (MCDSS, 2016).  
The total budget allocation to social protection increased by 133 percent from 
2011 to 2016, although as a share of the national budget, the sector’s share 
declined by 0.3 percent from 2.7 percent in 2015 to 2.4 percent in 2016 
(UNICEF, 2016). On the other hand, SCT allocation increased by 67 percent 
between 2015 and 2016; more than seven times over six years, although the 
direct donor contribution to the programme declined from 76 percent in 2013 
to 17 percent in 2015 and 2016. Indirect support, however, increased as the 
programme rolled out to new districts in the country. Some of the indirect 
support went towards technical assistance and procurement of equipment and 
assets such as Mobile Technology (M-Tech) enumeration gadgets (mobile 
phones and computers), vehicles and bicycles for all the districts (MCDSS, 
2018). DFID and UNICEF provided funding for procurement of such goods, 
but their expenditure is not reported to, or recorded by GRZ, though ownership 
of the assets is transferred to MCDSS (FRA, 2016). This arrangement is in line 
with the original memorandum of understanding (MOU), between GRZ and 
7 
 
the donors that eventually the programme should be wholly owned by the 
Government (MCDSS, 2012). This demonstrated the PF government’s 
commitment to the cause that was once side-lined by the MMD (UNICEF 
Zambia, 2016).  
As at 2018, the Government was contributing about 75 percent of the total 
SCT budget, although the overall Social Protection (SP) budget had declined 
nominally by 15 percent from K2.7 billion in 2017 to K2.3 billion in 2018. 
This decline was as a result of the reduction in the allocation to the Public 
Service Pension Fund (PSPF) which was reduced by 33 percent, despite 
remaining dominant in the entire SP budget at 46 percent at the time (UNICEF 
and ZIPAR, 2017). This development contradicted the commitment made by 
Government in the SNDP which prioritised poverty reduction through 
increased budgetary allocations to social protection (UNICEF and ZIPAR, 
2017).   
While there was a marginal reduction in budgetary allocation to the sector, the 
SCT budget on the other hand, had increased by 31 percent. This increase 
translated into 110, 000 additional beneficiaries or 19 percent increase in 
coverage. The increase in caseload was reiterated by the then Minister of 
Finance Mr. Felix Mutati (2016-2018), who announced to Parliament that 
Government was in 2018 going to increase the number of SCT beneficiary 
households from 590,000 in 2017 to 700, 000 and that the payment system, 
would fully migrate to the electronic system (Ministry of Finance, 2017). It 
has however been argued that, while the electronic delivery system would add 
value to the SCT scheme, the limited internet connectivity in most rural areas 
of Zambia, would make it difficult to implement such a system (UNICEF and 
ZIPAR, 2017).  Table 1 below shows the Social Cash Transfer scale up from 
2003 to 2018. 
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Table 1 Social Cash transfer scale up by beneficiary households (2003-2018) 
Year 
Number of 
districts 
Beneficiary 
Household 
Caseload 
Budget allocation  
(ZMW) (US$) 
2003 1 169 500,000 50,000 
2004 1 1,027 700,000 70,000 
2005 2 1,654 725,045 72,504 
2006 3 2,807 1,200,000 120,000 
2007 5 7,500 1,500,000 150,000 
2008 5 11,843 13,000,000 1,300,000 
2009 5 11,937 13,000,000 1,300,000 
2010 8 25,431 13,700,000 1,370,000 
2011 10 32,643 41,600,000 4,160,000 
2012 11 51,103 43,900,000 4,390,000 
2013 13 61,052 89,700,000 8,970,000 
2014 50 145,698 196,200,000 19,620,000 
2015 50 180,261 180,600,000 18,060,000 
2016 78 242,000 302,000,000 30,200,000 
2017 109 537,766 737,000,000 73,700,000 
2018 109 700,000 721,000,000 72,100,000 
Source: MCDSS (2018) Department of Social Welfare. 
*In 2018, some funds allocated in the budget were not released, therefore, Beneficiary 
transfers were more than 8 months (four cycles) behind, by December 2018. Less than 
70 percent of the total budget was released by 31st December 2018 (MCDSS, 2018). 
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Figure 1: Household Beneficiary caseload progression from 2003 to 2018. 
Source: MCDSS (2018) Department of Social Welfare 
 
Figure 1 shows the rollout progression of the SCT programme by household 
case load from 2003 to 2018 at national scale. 
The positive impact of the SCT on poverty reduction has made the programme 
to be on high demand from both the beneficiaries and politicians, hence its 
rapid scale up by Government (MCDSS, 2017). In line with this observation, 
Pruce and Hickey (2017), also admit that it would be in fact politically 
dangerous to remove cash transfers from communities that have become used 
to receiving them. This Author however does not completely agree with this 
view considering the long delays in the releases of SCT funds by the treasury 
especially in 2018 where beneficiaries have not been paid their grants for 
months, one would wonder how they are surviving. It, therefore, remains 
unclear whether the Government will pay all the unpaid arears to beneficiaries 
or not as the 2019 budget does not seem to suggest so. 
Nonetheless, former Minister of Community Development and Social Services 
Emerine Kabanshi (2013-2018), was once quoted saying:  
10 
 
“This programme has become so popular among the poor, because it 
is changing lives. Even those who once were sceptical about it and 
thought that the money came from Satanists are now demanding to be 
included on the programme. Social Cash Transfers are not satanic; 
this is Government money meant to help the poor,” (MCDSS, 2017). 
According to Concern worldwide (CW), (2017), the failure to reach most of 
the targeted beneficiaries in its Emergency SCT programme was attributed to 
the communities' erroneous, but strong perception that ‘free money’ was 
associated with ‘Satanism’. This seemed to be common among the rural poor, 
for instance, in the ‘Realigning Agriculture to Improve Nutrition (RAIN)’ 
project, CW (2017) revealed that the community associated the selection of 
pregnant women with Satanism, as a result they shunned the project. 
Anyhow, while it is usually more exciting to rapidly and vigorously rollout 
“Earth moving” programmes such as the SCT scheme, as they are sometimes 
referred to; this researcher is, however, of the view that it is even more 
important to pay attention to the anticipated challenges surrounding delivery 
mechanisms as the programme involves money. In a broader view, CID (2008) 
also admits that cash transfers often have inherent fiduciary risks, made up of 
high volumes of low value payments to be balanced with costs of 
implementation and achievement of objectives.  
By 2018, the SCT had rolled out to all the 109 districts in the country, yet 
delivery mechanisms were predominantly manual (MCDSS, 2018). CID 
(2008) however, contend that the longer-term programme for scaling up SCT 
nationally requires considerable planning and development. This planning 
cannot be effective if it does not consider quality assurance and control of the 
delivery mechanisms.  
Walusungu Simukoko, a Social Welfare Officer at MCDSS had this to say: 
“Social Cash transfers depend on how effective the payment systems are. 
If the systems are good, the programme succeeds, but if they are weak, 
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the programme also fails. It is therefore important that appropriate 
delivery mechanisms are in place to avoid failure.” 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Since 2007, social cash transfers in Zambia have been administered manually 
through Pay Point Managers (PPMs), [In chapter three we discuss details of 
how PPMs work]. In 2016, however, Cooperating Partners (DFID, UNICEF, 
IRISH AID, ILO, Swedish Embassy and Finland) in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) 
conducted a Fiduciary Risk Assessment (FRA) of the SCT programme and 
established that, the use of PPMs had some degree of corruption risk at petty 
level; there was potential for collusion between DSWOs, PPMs, CWAC 
members and beneficiaries or indeed their combination. There was anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that such corruption took place with intimated instances of 
PPMs and CWAC members colluding to divert funds from beneficiaries. 
CWAC members and other persons colluding to misrepresent their status and 
fraudulently obtain benefits, undue influence exerted by headmen on CWACs 
in the targeting and selection process. These claims were however 
unsubstantiated although the report maintained that these activities were 
possible and substantial. The overall corruption risk was however, rated 
moderate (CID, 2008). 
As if to sanction some of the foregoing allegations; on 4th February 2018, the 
Zambia Daily Mail carried an article entitled: “Chicken or No Cash.” In this 
article chief Mabumba of the Ushi people of Mansa (Luapula Province) was 
quoted as having said:  
“My chiefdom has received reports of some officers demanding a 
chicken and money from the aged and vulnerable people for them to be 
put on the social cash transfer programme.” (Daily Mail, 2018).   
To some extent this may seem to confirm the FRA claims that, while the 
programme design had good in-built controls, the overall arrangements for 
recording and monitoring were weak and inadequate for a programme whose 
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budget was nearly 70 percent of the Ministry’s total budget in 2016 (FRA, 
2016).  
Incidentally at that time, the Ministry recorded the expenditure on the 
programme as a single budget line in its Integrated Financial Management 
Information System (IFMIS), and the programme used excel rather than an 
accounting package for recording the detailed expenditure. There was also 
inadequate involvement of professional finance staff at MCDSS and the scale-
up was taking place when alternative payment models such the use of a 
commercial bank (ZANACO), were just being piloted, hence creating the risk 
that the pilots would not be adequately designed, monitored and managed 
(FRA, 2016).  
In 2016, Zambia also had national elections, at the same time there was a rapid 
scale up of the programme, the transition to dependence on GRZ funding, 
inconsistencies in the release of funding and the weaknesses in the financial 
oversight and monitoring, created a high fiduciary risk environment for the 
programme (FRA, 2016).  
According to FRA (2016), the overall fiduciary risk of the programme was 
rated high, while corruption risk was only considerable. On the other hand, 
Government’s commitment and credibility of Public Finance Management 
(PFM) reforms in the Ministry, aimed at strengthening financial accountability 
and tackling corruption were partially credible and the trajectory was that of 
increasing risk.  
As regards SCT however, earlier the FRA (2012), rated the overall corruption 
risk to be moderate because opportunities on the grant and administrative 
corruption in the programme were relatively low (FRA, 2016). Nevertheless, 
the risk of corruption had, however, risen since 2012 due to the significant 
scale up of the programme as well as the feast and famine in receipt of funds 
and the programme’s feeble financial monitoring and reporting systems (FRA, 
2016).  
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Some of the administrative challenges included lack of real time tracking 
system for payments to beneficiaries due to undeveloped Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) and poor infrastructure especially in rural 
towns. There have also been sporadic reports of deliberate delays in payments 
caused by some PPMs. In a district called Luvushmanda, in North-Western 
Province for instance, it once took three months before a PPM was discovered 
having used the beneficiaries’ money on his personal expenses instead of 
paying them. The culprit was removed from the programme and made to pay 
back. This is criminal! As per the programme guidelines, his deputy replaced 
him (MCDSS, 2018). In another incidence another PPM in Kitwe, claimed that 
he had been attacked and robbed off all the beneficiaries’ money by thugs. 
This case was reported to the Police; and he too, was dismissed from the 
programme. The other challenge was that expenditure returns were only 
submitted to DSWOs after receiving the next allocation of grants, “to cut 
down on allowances” for PPMs each time they travelled out of their duty 
stations on SCT activities as per the programme design.  As at December 
2018, the programme had 5,143 PPMs managing 13, 000 pay points 
countrywide (Some PPMs were responsible for more than one pay point). 
Table 2 below shows the distribution of PPMs by Province. 
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Table 2: Pay Point Managers distribution by province 
 
PROVINCE 
Number of 
PPMs   
Central 468 
Copperbelt 219 
Eastern 667 
Luapula 590 
Lusaka 191 
Muchinga 429 
North Western 407 
Northern 639 
Southern  767 
Western 766 
 TOTAL: 5,143 
Source: MCDSS (2018)  
Delayed funding by the treasury in between cycles, may also have negative 
implications on the programme including misappropriation of funds by 
unscrupulous PPMs who may end up using the funds in their custody before 
retirement as they can only retire such funds when next funding is released. As 
of December 2018, for instance, in five provinces namely: Luapula, Lusaka, 
Eastern, Southern and Western Province the most recent funds received were 
for March/April 2018. Funds for the remaining eight (8) months were still 
outstanding in the other five provinces namely of Northern, Muchinga, 
Copperbelt, Central and North-Western provinces (MCDSS, 2018). This delay 
worried the beneficiaries and other stakeholders including civil society and 
donors.  
It was, however established during this research that in fact, the Ministry of 
Finance had released insufficient funds to MCDSS to carter for all the 10 
Provinces at once for this period, hence the backlog. The picture on the ground 
looked even more complicated though.  
The other area of concern was poor record management system in some pay 
points and districts offices as observed in the Auditor General’s Report (2017), 
that there was poor record management at district and pay point levels as in 
some instances beneficiary details on payment schedules were altered by 
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PPMs. Some funds for CWACs were acquitted for by PPMs without the 
authority of the intended recipients. It was unclear whether the rightful 
beneficiaries received the money or not. As such, some PPMs were queried for 
failure to retire programme funds (AG Report, 2017).  
Similarly, as at 31st August 2018, retirement of funds amounting ZMW 24,120 
(US$ 2,412) for the year 2017 for Chibombo District beneficiaries, were not 
availed for audit (AG Report, 2017). While such observations may be 
sporadic, there are chances that the picture may worsen if vigorous 
assessments were to be conducted in all the 13,000 pay points countrywide. 
Such range of risks and recommendations by various assessors’ reports 
compelled the Ministry to consider alternative payment modalities as former 
Minister of Community Development and Social Services Emerine Kabanshi 
puts it:  
“In order to enhance safety, reliability, reduce fiduciary risk and 
improve accessibility to beneficiaries, the Ministry is considering an 
option of a mobile cash payment system for the programme.”  (Zambia 
Daily Mail, 2016) 
Kabanshi’s words were echoed by the then Eastern Province Permanent 
Secretary Mr. Chanda Kasolo in a speech read on his behalf by the then, 
Assistant Secretary Mr. Royd Tembo in February 2017 at the Orientation 
Workshop of DWAC members in Chipata. Mr. Kasolo had said that the 
Government was in the process of introducing an electronic payment system 
including the use of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) through the Banks 
and Post Office to the SCT programme in order to secure the payments and 
make them timely and reduce the risks involved in physically carrying money 
by PPMs (Lusakatimes.com).  
Arising from the foregoing, in 2016 the Ministry (MCDSS) contracted 
ZANACO (a commercial bank) to make SCT payments in Lusaka, Central and 
Eastern Provinces. A year later (in 2017), the Zambia Postal Services 
Corporation (ZAMPOST) was also engaged to make payments in Luapula and 
Western Provinces on Pilot basis.  
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According to Chaunga (2018), however, MCDSS engaged ZAMPOST in order 
to reduce administrative cost of the programme as ZAMPOST had pegged its 
commission at 8 percent only compared with ZANACO which was at 13 
percent (MCDSS, 2018).  
On the other hand, the Manual Payment System according to the Manual of 
Operations (2006), uses 10 percent of its allocation on administration although 
this is difficult to verify as this researcher established that different districts 
gave different percentages, but ranging from 10 to 20 percent administrative 
costs especially at district levels. The Ministry neither had a concrete record 
nor, an effective tracking system of admin funds and the records were not very 
well kept regarding such funds at various levels (MCDSS, 2018).  
Since the engagement of ZAMPOST, however, several issues emerged. In its 
Trimester Report (2018), for instance, the Department of Social Welfare 
(DSW), disclosed that ZAMPOST was over delaying making payments to the 
beneficiaries and there was no clear reason for that. By June 2018 ZAMPOST 
had not paid the July/August and September/October 2017 transfers totalling 
ZMW 1,088,640 (US$ 108,864), despite the Ministry having released the 
funds to the institution earlier (MCDSS, 2018). This meant that 4,147 
beneficiaries were deprived of a livelihood for close to eight (8) months or 
four bi-monthly cycles (Auditor General’s Report, 2017, p. 76). Such delays 
defeated the purpose of ensuring efficiency and cost effectiveness in a delivery 
system. Officers on the ground, including some beneficiaries indicated that 
PPMs were better than ZAMPOST. 
In other words, one would argue that, while established institutions such as the 
Post Office may seem to have the capacity to deliver quality services, it is only 
proper and necessary to conduct a due diligence before hiring them and regular 
monitoring is crucial. In similar lines, Arndt et al (2016) observes that, while 
there is a large and growing literature on the benefits of social protection 
programmes, there was need to invest more in the improvement of the delivery 
systems. The evidence from Zambia supports this position. 
17 
 
1.3 Research focus and Questions 
1.3.1 Research Focus 
The study focuses on the actual payment systems of the Social Cash Transfer 
programme from 2003 to 2018; what changed and How? My initial idea was to 
also examine “Why there was change” this was however complicated due to 
the investigations that were instituted into the payment modalities following 
the poor performance of ZAMPOST as would be seen later in this research. As 
at 2018, the Ministry had three delivery channels: The Manual (i.e. PPM), 
Electronic (Use of ATM visa cards) through ZANACO and ZAMPOST. These 
channels were used in different locations of the country. Sometimes two 
methods were used parallel to each other in a district, though not targeting the 
same beneficiaries. Each System had its own caseload. Table 3 below shows 
the caseloads of household beneficiaries per delivery channel as at 2018. 
Table 3: Summary of Zambia’s SCT Delivery Channels 
PAYMENT 
CHANNEL 
METHOD 
OF 
PAYMENT 
CASELOAD CONTACT 
POINT 
CATCHMENT 
AREA BY 
PROVINCE 
REMARKS 
Manual 
(PPM) 
Cash 
Payment 
396,881 Pay point 
(School/ Clinic) 
Southern, Northern, 
Muchinga, North-
Western, Copperbelt 
In provinces 
where no 
payment service 
providers were 
making 
payments, PPMs 
were used to 
deliver the 
transfers. 
ZAMPOST Cash 
payment 
166,464 Pay Point Luapula and Western ZAMPOST was 
originally 
contracted to pay 
in two provinces 
only. 
ZANACO 
(Use of ATM) 
 
Electronic 
payment 
11,318 Commercial 
Bank/ Agent 
Lusaka, Eastern and 
Central 
ZANACO was 
contracted to pay 
in the three 
provinces, but as 
at August 2018, 
it was only partly 
paying in Lusaka 
district of 
Lusaka Province. 
TOTAL:  574663    
Source: MCDSS (2018) 
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This study, therefore, attempted to have an in-depth understanding of the 
genesis of these delivery mechanisms regarding the implementation of the 
Social Cash Transfer programme; how each of the system was identified, how 
it worked, its strengths and weaknesses and make appropriate 
recommendations for policy action toward improvement. 
1.3.2 Research Question 
How have Social Grants in Zambia been paid and what lessons can be learnt 
from this? 
1.3.3 Purpose of the Study 
The aim of this study was to appreciate how Social Grants in Zambia have 
been paid over the years and identify the lessons learnt for Policy action. The 
study explored the challenges and their implications, asking whether the 
systems were successful or not.  
In this study, “success” implies the extent to which money meant for 
beneficiaries reaches them at the right time, in full amounts, on regular and 
predictable basis without any difficulties (MCDSS/GTZ, 2007). Barca et al, 
(2010) also describe “Success” in a delivery system simply as ‘ensuring that 
recipients collect the cash without disrupting their livelihoods or travelling 
dangerously for long periods.’ However, Oberländer and Brossman (2014) 
observe that cash delivery mechanisms absorb a high proportion of 
administrative cost, hence, represent key determinant of cost-effectiveness and 
efficiency in social grant programmes.  
Similarly, Barca et al. (2010) admit that in fact, there is comparatively little 
attention paid to delivery systems as most programmes are only experimenting 
with a range of approaches. Barca et al, (2010), believe that the choice of a 
payment system affects the cost and the barriers faced by beneficiaries and 
programme success. 
1.3.4 Research Objectives 
The Specific Objectives of this study are to: 
i. Establish the modalities through which cash transfers are paid 
to the beneficiaries;  
ii. Determine the roles played by various stakeholders in the 
implementation of delivery systems; 
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iii. Identify the merits and demerits of each payment modality and 
iv. Provide policy recommendations for improving SCT delivery 
systems in Zambia. 
 
1.3.5 Research Questions 
 
i. What are the delivery systems used in the social cash transfer 
programme in Zambia? 
ii. How were these systems identified? 
iii. What are the strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities of 
each of the payment systems? 
iv. What are the challenges of scaling up the payment systems? 
v. What is the role of Donors in determining the choice of a 
delivery system? 
vi. What is the role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the 
administration of cash transfer delivery systems?  
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Countries nowadays are striving to find alternatives to channel social grants to 
beneficiaries effectively. Globally, reports from institutions such as the World 
Bank, DFID and the Bankable Frontier Association (BFA) are advocating for 
the evolution, from cash-based pay-out systems to the electronic transfer 
systems (Torkelson, 2017). Putting it differently, social benefit programmes 
around the world are susceptible to error and fraud (DFID, 2006).  According 
to DFID (2006), in the UK, it is estimated that around £3.3 billion or about 3% 
of the total value of benefit payments is lost through customer error, official 
error and fraud in almost equal measure each year.  
Similarly, there are notable programmes in developing countries such as 
Mozambique, where the GAPVU cash transfer programme to war-displaced 
urban destitute households, despite being a powerful model in its first five 
years, collapsed lamentably due to corruption scandals, hence got replaced by 
the National Institute for Social Action Programme (DFID, 2005). This points 
to challenges to do with delivery mechanisms. 
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DFID (2005) contends that SCT programmes need in-depth assessments and 
analysis of risks to identify safeguards to put in place and prevent corruption as 
GAPVU completely failed due to inadequate controls in its delivery systems. 
Linked to this view, Torkelson (2017) suggests that although payment systems 
are usually designed to suit local context, they must always ensure that benefits 
reach the intended recipients in correct amounts and on time as stated in the 
South Africa Social Security Agency’s (SASSA) slogan: “Paying the right 
social grants to the right person at the right time and place, Njalo!” 
Barca et al. (2010), contend that, while cash has the capacity to trigger a wider 
set of developmental outcomes apart from being easier and cheaper to deliver 
than aid in kind, studies around delivery methods are still very limited. BFA 
(2006) also admits that different payment systems have traditionally received 
less attention than other operational aspects of programmes in the academic 
literature.  
According to BFA (2006), programme implementers are usually in a hurry to 
disburse, hence having little time to assess alternative options except in terms 
of relative costs and feasibility. This could be demonstrated by the insistence 
of GRZ to quickly reach the 700, 000 beneficiary households target even 
before rolling out the much-acclaimed electronic payment system. Incidentally, 
there seems to be no distinct budget line for setting up the electronic payment 
system for the Social Cash Transfer programme in the 2019 budget for the 
Ministry (MCDSS, 2018).     
According to DFID (2006), however, fiduciary risks can be mitigated most 
effectively at the design stage of the programme. The greatest risk of loss from 
error or fraud arises from the complexity in the eligibility criteria and 
operations. There is no standard design for cash transfer programmes that will 
mitigate all risks, but programmes should be designed in a simple way, yet 
meeting their objectives (DFID, 2006).  
In addition, appropriate monitoring and evaluation frameworks will help 
identify any failure in controls. In similar lines, Peters et al. (2008), suggest 
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that the key ingredients of success in programmes include concerted efforts to 
reach the target group and community participation. Encouraging local 
adaptation and careful monitoring of the effects of the programmes on poverty 
although, Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMICs) rarely involve the poor in 
the development of policies and in the actual implementation and monitoring 
of programmes (Peters et al., 2008).  
According to Peters et al. (2008), some of the indicators of programme success 
include ensuring that vulnerable populations have a say on how the strategies 
are developed, implemented, and accounted for in ways that demonstrate 
improvement in access by target groups. It was along these lines that this study 
was undertaken. 
1.5 Methodology 
 
Fieldwork was conducted in three purposefully selected districts of Zambia 
namely Lusaka, Rufunsa and Mongu. Data on payment systems were collected 
through guided interviews with purposively selected key informants in these 
districts. (It is worth noting that the name Lusaka in Zambia refers to both the 
district and the province in which the city of Lusaka is found, for the purpose 
of this field work, Lusaka refers to the district only). There are eight (8) 
districts in Lusaka province namely: Lusaka, Kafue, Chongwe, Rufunsa, 
Luangwa, Chirundu, Chilanga and Shibuyunji. In this study, only Mongu was 
chosen from outside of Lusaka province because it is situated in one of the few 
areas serviced by ZAMPOST, while the others had the manual system or 
ZANACO. The research involved both primary and secondary qualitative and 
quantitative data.  
 
1.5.1 Primary Data sources 
Primary Data was obtained through face to face interviews with key 
informants who included beneficiaries of the programme and its implementers 
(Officials from the Ministry and pay institutions). This was done in order to 
have a wider understanding of the delivery systems in line with the views of 
key stakeholders. The three districts that were selected for the field visits i.e., 
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Lusaka, Rufunsa and Mongu, represented different socio- economic 
perspectives and used different payment systems as follows: in Lusaka, a 
combination of the Manual and Electronic systems was used, 35 beneficiaries 
were interviewed; i.e. 20 paid by PPMs and the other 15 paid through the 
electronic system; in Rufunsa, only the Manual system was in use and 35  
beneficiaries were interviewed, while in Mongu, the Post office was 
responsible for payments, 60 beneficiaries were also interviewed. In addition, 
ten (10) PPMs were interviewed five (5) in Lusaka and the other five were 
interviewed in Rufunsa. Five (5) CWAC members were interviewed in each of 
the three districts and seven (7) Government Officials from MCDSS bringing 
the total number of respondents interviewed altogether to 162. This provided 
enough primary data regarding SCT delivery systems in Zambia as at 2018. 
The choice of the districts was representational and done to the convenience of 
the researcher. Interview guides were generated by the researcher as at 
Appendices 2 to 4 in order to be consistent and systematic during the 
interviews. Table 4 below, shows the summary breakdown of respondents by 
category and district. 
Table 4: Summary of respondents. 
RESPONDENTS 
District Beneficiaries PPMs CWAC  Officials Total 
Lusaka 35 5 5 5 50 
Rufunsa 35 5 5 1 46 
Mongu 60 0 5 1 66 
 Total 130 10 15 7 162 
• Note that in Mongu no PPM was interviewed because payments were done by the Postal 
Services (ZAMPOST) and no PPM was used. 
1.5.2 Sample Selection 
As already alluded to, non-probability purposive sampling was used in order to 
allow for effective targeting of key informants directly involved in the actual 
implementation of the programme. Dudovskiy (2017) contends that purposive 
sampling is applied when the selection of the sample is based on the judgment 
of the researcher, therefore, researchers can obtain a representative sample by 
using a sound judgment to save time and money. Bearing the foregoing in 
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mind, this researcher used purposive sampling to identify respondents from 
among the beneficiaries of the cash transfers, as well as from among the 
officials involved in the implementation of the programme. 
 
1.5.3 Secondary Data sources 
Secondary data was carefully selected from sources linked to social cash 
transfer delivery systems at MCDSS. These included: policy documents, 
relevant evaluation reports, journals and newspaper articles, scholarly research 
papers (both physical and online), reports written by institutions such as 
UNICEF and the World Bank, empirical and theoretical work published in 
books, conference papers and pieces of legislation on social protection and 
cash transfers.  Some of the core literature sources included: Pedro & Dubois 
(2018), HelpAge International (2012), Chiwele (2010), Siachiwena (2016), 
Seekings (2016), MCDSS (2006), MCDSS/GTZ (2007), Oberländer and 
Brossman, (2014), Barca et al (2010), Chaunga (2018), Revnivykh & Fedotov 
(2016), Lodorfos et al (2015), Pouliquen  (2000), Lusaka Times (2011), 
Habasonda (2009), Cumyn et al., (2018), Pruce and Hickey (2017), O’Neill 
(2011), Parker (2014), Lewis & Thornhill (2012), Schubert (2005),  Harvey & 
Bailey (2015), Andrews et al (2017), Adato & Hoddinott (2008), MCDSS 
(2017), MCDSS (2018), UNICEF (2015), Foster & Dominguez (2010), 
Furrow et al (1991), Catubig et al (2015), Walton (2016) to mention a few. 
1.6 Ethical Considerations 
Ethics are a very important aspect in research. Furrow et al. (1991) simply 
describes “Ethics” as avoiding causing harm. Research that involves human 
subjects or participants raises unique and complex ethical, legal, social and 
political concerns (Walton, 2016).  
 
According to Walton (2016), ethics are there to protect human participants and 
ensuring that research is conducted in a manner that serves the interests of 
individuals, groups and/or society. This involves risk management, protection 
of confidentiality and informed consent. Bryman and Bell (2007) also affirm 
that research participants should not be exposed to harm in any way and that 
respect for the dignity of research participants should always be prioritised. 
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Additionally, full consent should be sought from participants prior to the study 
and the protection of their privacy and confidentiality should be guaranteed. 
Further, anonymity of individuals and organisations participating in the 
research should also be assured and any deception or exaggeration about the 
aims and objectives of the study are to be avoided.  
 
Similarly, affiliations in any forms, sources of funding, as well as any possible 
conflicts of interests are to be declared, while any type of communication in 
relation to the research should be done with honesty and transparency. No 
misleading information or misrepresentation of primary data in any way is to 
be entertained (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
 
In order to ensure utmost ethical considerations in this study, therefore, this 
researcher sought permission from relevant authorities including the then 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Community Development and Social 
Services Dr. Liya N. Mutale and the then Director of Social Welfare Mr. 
Kennedy Mumba, permission was granted.  
 
Before commencement of the field activities in the districts, the researcher 
endeavoured to introduce himself to the DSWOs responsible for the 
implementation of the SCT programme and explained the purpose and 
objectives of the study. All respondents interviewed were told to participate 
voluntarily. It was also made clear that the participants were free to withdraw 
from the study at any stage if they so wished. Verbal consent was also sought 
from those that did not mind it including the use of names in the study report. Those 
who preferred written consent were given the opportunity to complete and sign the 
consent form; Appendix 1, while those who preferred anonymity had their names 
withheld accordingly and were assured that their names would not appear in 
the report as requested. No participant was pressured or coerced into this study. 
 
1.7 Data Collection and Analysis 
The data was collected through interviews conducted using an interview guide 
prepared by the researcher, based on the literature review regarding SCT 
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delivery systems.  Different guides were prepared for different cadres of 
respondents. The analytical framework was also drawn from the works of the 
Cooperating Partners (CPs) and research institutions that have published 
literature on SCT and social protection programmes in general. The guide for 
Government Officials in the Ministry was developed to ascertain the vision of 
the Social Protection Policy regarding SCT implementation framework. It also 
considered Policy development, leadership and stakeholder engagement and 
roles; policy motivations and implementation strategies. 
On the other hand, the Beneficiaries’ guide focused on the targeting criteria of 
beneficiaries, transfer values, delivery mechanism, appropriateness and 
convenience of the delivery system, community participation and grievance 
mechanism, while the guide for PSPs sought to bring out issues that had either 
facilitated or constrained effective service delivery in the implementation of 
the programme. The design of the guide was also informed by available 
literature on the “best practices” in the delivery of Social cash transfers. 
The researcher also reviewed the Financing Agreement between GRZ and 
donors on the Social Cash Transfer programme.  As much as possible, data 
was collected from different sources, or used a combination of interviews and 
literature review for the purposes of triangulation to enhance the validity of the 
research findings. 
The Data Analysis methods included review of documentary evidence from 
secondary data in comparison with primary data obtained through the 
interviews. This enhanced understanding and explanation of the findings of the 
study.    
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1.8 Description of Study sites 
 
Figure 2: Zambia Districts Map 
 
 
Source: http://ontheworldmap.com/zambia/zambia-districts-map.html 
 
Lusaka is the largest town and capital city of Zambia. It has an estimated 
population of 1.700 million people (CSO, 2010). The middle and upper class 
of the residents are in formal employment in Government, private sector, Civil 
Society Organisations, Quasi-government and the Local Authorities.  About 70 
percent of the residents are the lower class that lives in regularized slums 
known as improvement areas (UN-Habitat, 2007).  
 
According to UN-Habitat (2007), Lusaka has 35 regularized informal 
settlements. The Land tenure of these settlements is secured through 
acquisition of occupancy licenses with tenure of 30 years, renewable. 
Residents of these areas live in overcrowded conditions and are vulnerable to 
communicable diseases including tuberculosis. The housing standards are poor 
due to high poverty levels. These areas also lack essential infrastructure and 
social services especially water and sanitation. Most people here live by 
trading, street vending; work as labourers in parastatal and private companies 
Rufunsa 
Lusaka 
Mongu 
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or work as domestic workers, while those not in any of these jobs, survive by 
begging or other informal ways. It is this category of people that are targeted 
by the Social Cash Transfer programme (MCDSS, 2014).  
 
Lusaka is accessible by a network of roads (gravel and tarmac roads). Mobile 
phone network is generally good, and the city has several banks and agents and 
Post offices. It also has many schools and health facilities that are used as pay 
points for the social cash transfers programme. This programme was 
introduced during the national scale up of the SCT programme in 2015/16. 
Lusaka as at August 2018, had a caseload of 11,318 households’ beneficiaries, 
out of which, only 3,193 or 28 percent were being paid electronically by 
ZANACO, while the rest were being paid manually by PPMs (MCDSS, 2018).  
Rufunsa is one of the most recently established districts in Zambia. It was 
delinked from Chongwe in 2013; two years after the Patriotic Front had 
assumed power following the 2011 election. Rufunsa has a population estimate 
of 45, 000 people (CSO, 2015). This district had a total of ten (10) wards, 
twenty-one (21) Area Coordinating Committees and seventy (70) CWACs. 
The district has 26 pay points and 27 mobile sites (Rufunsa DSWO, 2019). 
This town is situated about 160 kilometers east of Lusaka and most of it, is 
predominantly rural with limited infrastructure. Mobile phone network is 
restricted with poor signal in most areas especially as you go further away 
from the main road and the town Centre. There are no banking facilities except 
the mobile ones and the Post Office. This town, however, has a number of 
primary and secondary schools and Health centers distributed across it, which 
serve as pay points for the social cash transfers. Rufunsa has a caseload of 
2,607 household beneficiaries of the social cash transfers (MCDSS, 2018). In 
terms of road network, the district is connected by tarmac from Lusaka (the 
Great East Road), but most of its feeder roads are earth or gravel ones.  Most 
of the residents here are peasant farmers and vendors. Like Lusaka, the Social 
Cash Transfer programme was introduced in Rufunsa in 2015 and the delivery 
method is manual. 
Mongu is the provincial capital of Western Province. Its population is 
estimated at 179,600 (CSO, 2015), while its social cash transfer caseload is 
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5,782 households (MCDSS, 2018). Most of the residents of Mongu are peasant 
farmers, fishermen and some civil servants. Mongu is 607.5 kilometres west of 
Lusaka. Most of its outlying areas are in the rural; transportation is mostly by 
road and canals particularly in the rainy season. Most of the land is plain with 
sandy loams, which get flooded and impassable in the rainy season. Mobile 
phone network coverage is fair with relatively good signal, especially at the 
district Centre. There are also a notable number of banks, post offices and 
schools distributed across the district that can serve as pay points. As at August 
2018, ZAMPOST was making cash transfer payment in Mongu (MCDSS, 
2018). 
1.9 Scope of the Study 
The study involved critically examining the structures, functionality, and the 
roles played at various levels of disbursing cash transfers using the three 
payment modalities in place i.e. Manual, Electronic and the Post Office. 
1.10 Limitations of the study 
At the time of this study, there was no single district in the country that had all 
the three payment modalities in use at once. The maximum you would get was 
at least two models. Among the study sites, only Lusaka had both the 
electronic and the manual system complementing each other. Rufunsa and 
Mongu had one model each; the Manual and the Post Office respectively. This 
set up affected data collection as it meant travelling from one district to the 
other in order to cover all the three models under study. This was amidst time 
and financial constraints as the research was not a sponsored one. To make 
matters worse, in the middle of the research, ZAMPOST got entangled in an 
operational disturbance following allegations of misapplication and 
maladministration of SCT funds by the institution. This led to the suspension 
of six top management officials pending investigations (Zambia Reports, 
2018). This development was a major setback as it made officials from the 
institution unwilling to provide any information on the programme. As a result, 
this researcher mostly relied on available reports and interviews with 
beneficiaries, CWACs, PPMs and Government Officials involved in the 
implementation of the programme. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
Having given the introduction and the background of the study in the previous 
chapter, this chapter reviews the literature on social grants delivery 
mechanisms in different parts of the world including Zambia. 
2.2 AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL CASH TRANSFER 
DELIVERY MECHANISMS 
 
Social Cash Transfer delivery mechanisms involve the movement of funds 
from the Ministry responsible for Finance (or Donor account) to the 
implementing Ministry or Agency. The implementing Ministry disburses the 
funds to available channels for actual payment to beneficiaries, based on data 
from its Management Information System (MIS), (Farhat and Lynn, 2018). 
According to HelpAge International (2018), however, the way social grants 
are paid can affect the impact of the programme on both the implementer and 
the recipient. HelpAge International (2018), is also cognisant of the fact that 
there is no payment mechanism that is perfect. The adoption of a delivery 
system is therefore, driven by inherent characteristics such as its functionality, 
coverage, interoperability, open versus closed loop systems, cost and 
registration and authentication, although globally there seems to be consensus 
that electronic payments are more promising in delivering cash to vulnerable 
beneficiaries than manual systems. E-payments have flexibility, speed, 
reduced costs, reduced leakages and they are more transparent (HelpAge 
International, 2018). 
In the previous chapter, this researcher attempted to define delivery 
mechanisms in line with Adato and Hoddinott (2008) as well as Barca et al. 
(2016). While Adato and Hoddinott (2008) simply describe Delivery 
Mechanisms as the means by which cash is delivered, Barca et al. (2016) go 
further to elaborate delivery systems as the “pull” and “push” methods of 
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delivery. Whereas the “pull” method refers to the manual payment system, the 
“push” method refers to the electronic delivery system. Whichever definition 
one settles for when it comes to social cash transfers, it simply means the 
channel of moving money from the Bank to the Beneficiary. 
2.3 Manual Payment System 
 
This method involves physical transmission of money from the bank to the 
beneficiaries. Recipients collect their money from specific locations on 
specific dates only (Barca et al., 2016). In some countries pay points using the 
Manual System include local authorities, NGOs and Post Offices (Devereux 
and Vincent, 2010).  
In Zambia, it was not until 2016, that alternative methods to the Manual 
System were introduced.  Prior to this, the only known social cash delivery 
method was the Manual System or rather the “pull” system. According to 
Oberländer and Brossman (2014), one of the advantages of this system is that 
it does not require massive infrastructure investment despite generating high 
visibility of the programme as officers are in direct contact with beneficiaries 
at every disbursement. This allows them to assist whenever they are required 
to do so, (Statham, 2012, as cited by Oberländer and Brossman, 2014).  
Although the Manual System has got these advantages, it also has several 
weaknesses including the risk of transporting large sums of money from the 
Bank to remote areas especially when the delivery schedule is widely known 
(Oberländer and Brossman, 2014). Since cash is physically transported, 
corruption and fraud can easily occur although there is very scanty information 
regarding such in Zambia’s SCTs. The manual system also has the 
disadvantage of making beneficiaries travel to designated pay points on 
specified days and queuing for several hours thereby incurring opportunity 
costs as they cannot undertake other productive activities in the meantime 
(Oberländer and Brossman, 2014). Rather than depending on cash transfers 
alone, some beneficiaries are also involved in piece works or alternative 
livelihoods for survival (Wietler, 2007).  
Oberländer and Brossman (2014) consider the Manual System to be highly 
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inconvenient especially to the elderly or sick people who may not be able to 
collect their transfers on their own and rely on deputies. During the interviews 
conducted by this researcher in Mongu, it was established that at least 16.7 
percent of the respondents used deputies to collect their money from pay 
points.  
The explicit identification of beneficiaries through queuing on pay days can 
have serious implications on personal safety and lead to stigmatization in 
communities (Oberländer and Brossman, 2014). According to Barca et al., 
2010), this delivery method can neither be easily scaled up nor does it provide 
the opportunity to promote financial inclusion of beneficiaries. Smith et al., 
2011, p.4, cited by Oberländer and Brossman, (2014), also admits that it is 
these weaknesses that have led many developing agencies to abandon the 
“pull” system and resorted to the “push” system which “pushes down” 
delivery to the individual beneficiaries. In this regard, electronic payment 
methods have become more popular and it is estimated that almost 50 percent 
of all SCT programmes in the developing World, are now using the electronic 
delivery mechanisms, the “push” system. 
2.4 Electronic Payment System 
Electronic payment (E-payment) systems are gaining grounds nowadays 
everywhere. Globally, countries have adopted two approaches towards 
electronic payments, particularly mobile money: the bank led model and the 
non-bank led model (Farhat and Lynn, 2018). According to Oberländer and 
Brossman (2014), however, any electronic delivery system has two steps: first, 
governments or donor organisations electronically transfer cash to the bank, 
which deposits the money in personalized accounts such as e-money accounts; 
and secondly, the beneficiaries withdraw the cash from the accounts at a 
network of pay points.  
According to Emmett, 2012, cited by Oberländer and Brossman (2014), there 
are several electronic delivery methods with different networks of pay points. 
These include Bank branches or Post Offices; Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs), shopkeepers with Point of Sale (POS) devices, or mobile money 
agents. (A mobile money agent is a person or business that is contracted to 
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facilitate transactions for users. This involves cash-in and cash-out systems 
that earn a commission for performing such services on behalf of the 
contractor) (Mobile Money Definitions, 2010).  
By means of these systems, beneficiaries access their accounts with smart 
cards, magnetic stripe cards or mobile phones using biometric identifiers or 
Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) via what is sometimes known as 
“branchless banking” as it does not use conventional Bank branches 
(Oberländer and Brossman, 2014). 
Similarly, Governments contract Banks, smartcard platforms, or mobile 
network operators (MNO), to provide networks to electronically transfer cash 
to recipients (Vincent and Cull, 2011).  
According to Gelb and Decker (2012), most advanced technological delivery 
methods are owned by leading enterprises without which governments can 
hardly switch to electronically delivered social cash transfers (Oberländer and 
Brossman, 2014). 
Strengths: Like any other system, Electronic payment systems have got their 
own strengths and weaknesses. Oberländer and Brossman (2014) observe that 
electronically transferring money to pay points substantially reduces 
transaction costs on the programme as it saves transportation costs, security 
and insurance of cash to remote areas and governments do not have to employ 
staff for sorting cash and manually filling the envelopes.  
Equipment and staff costs for transporting and handing out the envelopes do 
not arise, which reduces staff vulnerability to ambushes, as they are no longer 
required to travel with large sums of cash (Devereux & Vincent, 2010). This 
method also reduces costs due to less exposure to corruption and fraud 
compared with the manual systems (Oberländer and Brossman, 2014).  
It is estimated that about 44 percent of the total funds spent on Social Welfare 
programmes in India are fraudulently diverted through a manual system (Dutta 
et al, 2010, cited in Gelb & Decker, 2012). For this reason, Gelb & Decker 
(2012) affirm that electronic delivery methods are less prone to leakage as they 
create an auditable trail from the government to the final recipient.  
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Similarly, Devereux and Vincent (2010) add that since the electronic transfer 
process involves banks, stringent banking regulations apply which demand 
accurate documentation of all disbursements, thereby making it harder to 
illegally divert large sums of money. Recipients can only withdraw their 
money upon successful authentication through unique identifiers. This reduces 
the risk of fraud.  
Electronic payment systems also provide an opportunity to eliminate ‘ghost 
beneficiaries’ from registration lists (Emmett, 2012, cited in Oberländer and 
Brossman, 2014). This, however, works well if the people responsible for 
updating the Information Management System (IMS) are dedicated and do it 
regularly otherwise, the same system can be manipulated to benefit ineligible 
beneficiaries. According to Revnivykh and Fedotov (2016), information 
systems cannot be the ideal and the more complex they are; the more flaws 
and vulnerabilities of different kinds they have. Whichever the case therefore, 
what is key is commitment. 
In Botswana, South Africa, and India the introduction of biometric 
identification system reduced the number of beneficiaries by 12-25 %, as 
nonexistent beneficiaries were cleaned from data files (Gelb and Decker, 
2012). Pickens et al. (2009) also observes that when payments are made 
directly to instruments controlled by recipients, such as debit cards or mobile 
phones, the opportunities for corruption are reduced. In Argentina, the 
percentage of Jefes participants who claimed that they paid a bribe to local 
officials to access their benefit dropped from 3.6 percent to 0.3 percent after 
the Ministry of Social Development switched to an electronic benefits card 
(Duryea and Schargrodsky, 2007).  
According to Pickens et al. (2009) this means that an estimated US$10.7 
million gets reaches the intended recipients. (US$10.7 million is equal to 15 
months of fees that the government pays Banco de la Nacion to deliver Jefes 
grants), (Pickens et al., 2009). While moving to electronic delivery cuts costs 
and leakage for the government, it also lays a foundation for offering 
recipients a financially inclusive account (Pickens et al., 2009). Further, 
technology has the potential to reduce beneficiaries’ opportunity costs of 
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collecting transfers as it allows them to cash out their money at convenient pay 
points, hence reducing travel time and costs (Oberländer and Brossman, 2014).  
Gelb & Decker (2012) also admit that shortening the distance to cash-out 
points lowers the barrier to access especially for individuals who are unable to 
walk long distances or those that have busy work schedules. With electronic 
delivery methods recipients can decide when they would like to cash out their 
transfers at a pay point. Such flexibility increases convenience for recipients 
and avoids long waiting times as the case is with the manual system 
(Oberländer and Brossman, 2014).  
Bold, Porteous & Rotman, 2012, p. 13; CGAP, 2013, p. 2 cited in Oberländer 
and Brossman (2014), also reinforce the fact that evidence consistently 
suggests significant reductions in travel and waiting times for beneficiaries 
through electronic systems. According to Barca et al, (2010) being able to 
choose when to cash out transfers and at which pay point is not only 
convenient and less degrading, but also more secure for beneficiaries. In 
agreement with Barca et al., 2010, Emmett 2012, cited by Oberländer and 
Brossman (2014) also adds that since travel distances are shortened and 
recipients can discretely choose when to withdraw their transfers, they are less 
vulnerable to robbery on their way back home. Electronic delivery methods 
can, help to bridge the digital divide as it provides beneficiaries an opportunity 
to learn how to use modern information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) such as ATMs, electronic benefit cards, or mobile phones (Devereux 
and Vincent, 2010).   
Weaknesses: While electronic delivery methods have several advantages as 
outlined above, they however, have weaknesses. According to Oberländer and 
Brossman (2014), one prominent weakness of this system is that, it requires 
high set-up capital for establishing networks of pay points such as contracted 
shopkeepers who need to be equipped with POS devices and/or enough ATMs 
to be installed. Each beneficiary requires a smartcard, a magnetic stripe card, 
or a mobile phone in order to access the account. Despite high set-up costs for 
fraud-preventing technology, however, electronic delivery methods are not full 
proof of this vice (Oberländer and Brossman, 2014).  
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Devereux & Vincent (2010) p. 374 observe that, while, biometric technology 
can prevent payment of benefits to wrong recipients, it cannot eliminate the 
risk of fraudulent registration of ineligible individuals. Further, Oberländer and 
Brossman (2014) contend that even if competition between agents reduces the 
risk of corruption, it is not easy to assure that agents do not charge additional 
fees for their cash-out services. Further, since technology is a key feature in 
the electronic delivery systems, it would be difficult to establish a dense 
network of pay points in remote areas because shopkeepers need to have 
access to a decentralised electricity source such as a solar panel for them to be 
able to charge their POS devices.  
According to Statham, 2012, p. 2, cited by Oberländer and Brossman (2014), 
mobile phone-based solutions require mobile network coverage, which may 
not be available in remote areas, while the use of agents makes it difficult for 
government officers to have direct contact with beneficiaries. Governments 
collaborate with private enterprises in order to benefit from the most-advanced 
technological solutions for electronic cash delivery to beneficiaries (Catubig et 
al, 2015). An effective payment system, therefore, implies low transaction 
costs to the program and minimal opportunity costs borne by beneficiaries and 
inefficiencies in payment mechanisms may diminish the net value obtained by 
recipients. Lessons can be learned from the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino 
Program (4Ps) of the Philippines, which uses account-linked cards provided by 
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), which serves as the disbursing 
institution of the 4Ps (Catubig et al, 2015).  
Like the SCT scheme of Zambia, the 4Ps experienced a rapid scale up at its 
inception. As a result, need arose for more effective and efficient payment 
solutions because of the limited capacity of the LBP to pay recipients in 
remote areas. Accordingly, the LBP was only kept as a sole conduit for two 
years and other methods were introduced. Some of the notable challenges 
surrounding the 4Ps payment mechanism included: (1) inaccuracy; (2) 
untimeliness; (3) remoteness; and (4) the absence of banking institutions, 
payments were done on specific days and at a specific venue (Catubig et al, 
2015).  
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Recipients in remote areas, travel to specific venues hence incurring 
transportation costs. The LBP’s main thrust is to disburse the cash to 
beneficiaries in a timely and safe manner, regardless of program guidelines.  
On the other hand, recipients with cash cards withdrew their payments with 
some flexibility in terms of timing of payouts from any LBP automated teller 
machines (ATM), free of charge, or at any Bancnet/Megalink/Expressnet 
ATM, where the program covers up to Php20 (US$ 0.41) of the transaction fee 
(Catubig et al, 2015).  
Other social cash transfer payment systems include: “cash-in-envelope,” 
voucher-based, pre-paid ATM cash cards, and mobile money transfer 
products. The most important aspect in the choice of a payment system is the 
consideration for security risks that the system poses, not only to the 
beneficiaries, but to the payment staff as well (Catubig et al, 2015).  In this 
regard, Electronic systems are considered to have great potential to reduce 
transaction and security costs for governments and recipients through faster 
payments and less leakage than manual systems. It is believed that e-payments 
would improve accessibility and security for beneficiaries especially the older 
people, people with disabilities and those in remote areas (HelpAge 
International, 2012). According to Parker (2014) the Government of Brazil 
saves 5.8 percent of the cost of payments to Bolsa Familia beneficiaries by 
having 15 percent of payments made electronically through bank accounts or 
paid out by agents. Parker (2014) also observes that by leveraging existing 
payment infrastructures, governments can reduce the cost of making payments 
and in countries whose payment infrastructure distribution is inadequate to 
make e-payments, the cost to governments may increase in the short-term. 
According to Parker (2014) the Government of Colombia paid US$6.24 for 
account-based payments through agents; from the previous cash payment fee 
of US$5.20.   
When it comes to the users, studies have shown that beneficiaries welcome the 
convenience of e-payments despite the accompanying challenges (Parker, 
2014). In 2012, South Africa’s SASSA, for instance, contracted a private 
company called Cash Paymaster Services (CPS), to design a standardised 
National Social Assistance payment and registration system. Those with 
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accounts were issued with a MasterCard branded debit card which allows them 
to withdraw funds free of charge at SASSA cash pay-points or participating 
merchant stores. Funds can also be withdrawn from any ATM where ordinary 
bank fees apply. Account holders are also able to swipe their cards to make 
payments at POS terminals and can purchase such goods as airtime and 
electricity using Unstructured Supplementary Services Data (USSD) 
functionality on their cell phones as unique identifiers (Financial Inclusion, 
2016). This national card-based biometric enrolment and payment system was 
designed to make social grant payment more secure for both the claimants and 
the state, but it has its unique challenges including routine exploitation through 
fraudulent transactions and Banks cannot rigorously govern what happens 
within the systems (Financial Inclusion, 2016).  
According to Vally (2016), the e-payment system turned out to be insecure 
because it displayed several grant cancellations, extensive unauthorised 
monetary deductions from claimants’ accounts, and unnecessary waiting by 
beneficiaries. Parker (2014), however, observes that many countries nowadays 
are in fact, resorting to electronic delivery systems because technology and 
infrastructure are sufficiently advanced to support more efficient and 
transparent payment systems, though HelpAge International (2012) does not 
seem to agree with this view as they believe that there is insufficient data and 
evaluations to provide a comprehensive cost benefit analysis of e-payment 
systems in comparison with the manual systems.  Without proper data, 
therefore, it is difficult for anyone to ascertain that a system is the best 
(HelpAge International, 2012). Table 5 below compares the cost and the 
performance in carrying out payments between the manual and the electronic 
delivery systems. 
Table 5:  Comparing costs and performance of e-payment and physical payment 
systems 
 Physical cash payment Technology enhanced 
(electronic payment 
Country 
Time taken by 
beneficiary to 
collect (hours) 
2-4 hours 0.5 hours (29% of recipients lose 
income) South Africa, 
India 
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Cost per 
payment cycle 
(%/US$) 
2-15%/US$1-4 2-10%/US$1-2 South Africa, India, 
Colombia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 
Malawi 
Leakage (%) 4-15% 1-4% South Africa (8% paid 
to get grant), India 
Time to 
implement 
(months) 
3-12 months 6 months + Various 
Additional 
financial services 
None Yes: savings, credit, 
insurance 
“ 
Additional 
developmental 
impact 
None Yes “ 
Source:  Pickens et al, 2009, cited by HelpAge (2012). 
2.5 Challenges of scaling up electronic delivery systems 
 
Scaling up an electronic delivery system is not an easy task. HelpAge 
International (2012) as well as UNICEF and ZIPAR (2017) all admit that e-
payment systems require substantial up-front investment. This researcher is 
also in agreement with the trio as inadequate mobile network infrastructure for 
instance, was part of the reasons why it had taken long for ZANACO to scale 
up e-payment services to some parts of Central and Eastern Provinces 
(MCDSS, 2018). Zambia has very few Banks and Post Offices especially in 
rural areas where infrastructure is not fully developed, and Mobile technology 
is limited. Nonetheless, HelpAge International (2012), suggests that Pay points 
could be bank branches, ATMs and/or a network of branchless bank ‘agents’ – 
especially local shopkeepers, which if not funded, would use cash flows from 
their own business activities to pay recipients and get reimbursed by the bank 
with a commission, credited to their account as funds are released. The agents 
use mobile phones or point of sale (POS) devices to process the payment, 
which is linked to the bank via a mobile phone network. The POS provides an 
electronic record of the transaction through a paper receipt for the beneficiary 
and the agent.  These devices could include biometric identification technology 
as it is regarded as a business instrument that strengthens security and 
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improves operational efficiencies through strict identity controls (Financial 
Inclusion, 2016).  
According to HelpAge International (2012), almost half of the 40-plus cash 
transfer programmes set up since 1999 involve e-payment systems, this 
includes those in China, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kenya, Pakistan, India, Peru 
and Yemen. Some of the largest cash transfer programmes using e-payment 
systems are: Pakistan’s 2009 flood response project which, delivered 1 million 
prepaid smartcards to recipients in 70 days through a network of 12,000 
branchless bank agents, Mexico’s Oportunidades conditional cash transfers 
(CCT), reaching 6 million households using magstripe cards linked to accounts 
and smartcards. South Africa’s Social Security Agency (SASSA) pays 9 
million recipients using prepaid smartcards and magstripe cards linked to a 
bank account, Colombia’s Familiasen Acción cash transfer reaching 1.8 
million recipients via savings accounts that pay interest. Brazil’s 2 million 
Bolsa Familia recipients receiving cash payments via magstripe card in the 
public Caixa Economica bank. India has 4 million recipients of benefits under 
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) paid through 
branchless banking. All these systems require substantial investment in 
technology and are complex to establish (Catubig et al., 2015). 
2.6 Delivery options and existing infrastructure 
 
All delivery systems require a kind of infrastructure of some sort. According to 
Catubig et al (2015) some of the things to consider when choosing a delivery 
system include availability of delivery options such as: banks, postal services, 
mobile operators and so on. Other considerations include mobile phone 
network coverage and motivations for service providers such as cost benefit, 
social mission or image-boosting and suitability for attainment of program 
objectives; infrastructures, costs, resilience, flexibility and minimization of the 
risk of fraud and corruption. Corruption and security risks may be reduced if 
institutions have strong control systems (Catubig et al., 2015). 
 
40 
 
2.7 Delivery via sub-contracted parties (remittance 
companies) 
 
In the Philippines, sub-contracted parties accept some responsibility for loss. 
As such, security risks for agency are reduced as remittance companies have 
greater access to insecure areas than agencies. One advantage of this 
arrangement is that recipients may be familiar with the systems and the system 
is also flexible to beneficiaries when receiving their cash (Catubig et al., 
2015).  
2.8 Delivery by pre-paid cards or mobile systems 
As regards banks, there is possible reduction in corruption and security risks. 
The workload for the agency staff is also reduced and there is greater 
flexibility for recipients. Greater flexibility on where cash can be collected 
from (Mobile Points of Sale, local traders). A mobile phone (individual or 
communal) can be provided at low cost to those who do not have (Catubig et 
al., 2015). 
 
2.9 What are delivery systems? 
According to Adato and Hoddinott (2008), implementing social protection 
programmes demands that citizens should be aware of the programme and that 
beneficiaries should be correctly identified. Administrative and operational 
systems that deliver regular benefits with effective monitoring and evaluation 
structures should be in place. Delivery systems are, therefore, the means by 
which services are realized.  
Adato and Hoddinott (2008) however argue that service delivery will always 
be a challenge in environments that have weak capacity. Barca et al. (2016) 
also seems to admit that payment systems affect the ease, cost and dignity with 
which recipients engage with programmes. According to Barca et al. (2016), 
therefore, recipients’ experience of payment systems is driven by whether the 
system uses a “pull” or “push” mechanism. The “Pull” mechanism requires 
recipients to report to a specific location at a specified date and time. The 
“push” mechanism on the other hand, makes transfers to recipients, usually 
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electronically, which can be collected at any time; Bankable Frontier 
association (2006, 2008); (Devereux and Vincent, 2010).  
Some of the barriers that payment systems encounter are physical barriers, 
administrative barriers, financial and ownership (Barca et al., 2016). It is, 
therefore, apparent that due to development and technological advancement 
nowadays, there are several channels of delivering cash to vulnerable groups 
around the world. Some systems are simple and relatively cheap, while others 
are complex and require substantial investment (Adato and Hoddinott, 2008). 
The choice of which delivery system to invest in, depends on the capacity of a 
country as simply copying or mimicking what other countries are using might 
be unsustainable since countries differ.  
Adato and Hoddinott (2008) admit that countries with high levels of poverty 
and low institutional and financial capacities, should start with simpler 
interventions and as capacities buildup, more complex interventions can be 
adopted. In a way, Andrew et al. (2017), discourages copying for the sake of it. 
They call it “Isomorphic mimicry.” According to Andrew et al. (2017) 
“Isomorphic mimicry” is simply a “technique of successful failure” that 
perpetuates capability traps in development. It is the tendency of governments 
to mimic other governments’ successes, replicating processes, systems, and 
even products of “best practice” examples. Mimicry often conflates form and 
function and leads to a situation where “looks like” substitutes for “does.” As 
a result, governments seem capable after the mimicry, yet they are incapable. 
According to Andrews et al, (2017), Isomorphic mimicry is endemic in 
development and it is a major reason why countries do not build real capability 
even after years of policy and reform engagement; amidst billions of dollars 
for capacity building work.  
A payment system according to BOZ (2016) is a means by which financial 
transactions are settled through transfer of monetary value, from one party (the 
payer) to another (the payee). It comprises the contributors (institutions) and 
the users (customers/clients), the rules and regulations that guide its operation 
and the standards and technologies on which the system operates. “A well-
designed and well-functioning payment system contributes to the financial 
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stability and to the effective functionality of the country's economy” (BOZ, 
2016).  
 
In similar lines, the Bank of Sierra Leone (2018) also admits that payment 
systems are driven by customer demand for convenience, ease of use and 
access.  
 
While BOZ (2016) may be referring to payment systems in commercial banks 
and other similar institutions, the principle of ensuring that systems work 
effectively applies to all payment systems as every consumer appreciates 
quality services. To this effect, BOZ (2016) underscores the importance of 
safety, security, reliability and efficiency of a payment system in line with the 
Bank of Zambia Act of 1996 and the National Payment Systems Act of 2007. 
The social cash transfer scheme is not exempted from ensuring that the quality 
of service delivery is good (MCDSS, 2018). 
In stressing the importance of delivery systems of the SCT programme, 
Walusungu Simkoko a Social Welfare Officer at MCDSS puts it this way: 
“Payments are the backbone of the social cash transfer scheme, if 
payments are effective, the programme succeeds and if they are 
not, the programme fails.” 
Simukoko’s views cannot be over emphasized as they simply demonstrate how 
important the quality of service delivery is in programmes that involve actual 
cash payments. 
In Viet Nam, 30 to 70 percent of beneficiaries of social grants pay informal 
commissions to intermediaries (local or school officials) in order to collect 
their money, support to households, is therefore, reduced through (unofficial) 
fees imposed when receiving cash transfers (UNICEF, 2013). While the 
Vietnamese situation may seem so remote, we have already heard that in 
Zambia also, some Officials demand for chickens as commissions (Zambia 
Daily Mail, 2017).  
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2.10 How are the delivery systems identified? 
Identification of appropriate delivery systems in the implementation of social 
cash transfers is crucial to the success of the programme. Barca et al, (2010), 
reveals that the choice of delivery systems affects recipients. For this reason, it 
is important to bear in mind the implications of choosing a delivery system 
over the other in the cash transfer programme.  As much as possible, needs 
assessments or due diligence should be conducted to ascertain the capacity of a 
system to deliver effectively. There should also be stakeholder buy-in so that 
appropriate systems can be designed for successful implementation of the 
programme. Apart from the beneficiaries, donors and civil society 
organisations (CSOs) are major stakeholders in the delivery Social Cash 
Transfers (MCDSS, 2018).  
2.11 Role of Stakeholders 
2.11.1   What is the role of donors in the social cash transfer 
delivery process? 
Since the inception of the programme, there have been several studies 
sponsored by donors such as UNICEF, DFID, ILO and others to assess the 
impact of the programme on poverty and the livelihood of its beneficiaries. In 
2008 on wards however, donors supported the Fiduciary Risk Assessments 
(FRAs) which focused more on the delivery mechanisms of the SCT 
programme (MCDSS, 2017). The FRAs have over time, highlighted different 
risks related to the delivery of cash transfers to beneficiaries. The risks have 
ranged from: low level to medium and high risk. Recommendations to improve 
the systems have been presented to the Ministry for consideration. Among the 
high risks identified was the handling of resources by non-accounting officers 
in districts. This according to FRA (2016) had serious implications on the 
programme especially with the rapid scale up. It was therefore, recommended 
that finance officers be recruited for the programme for each provincial Centre 
to take responsibility of reviewing and collating district budgets and 
expenditure reports; submitting reports to HQ, and providing support and 
guidance to the provincial and district offices. In addition, provide support 
beyond the SCT to other Ministry programmes and improve reporting and 
monitoring tools such as:  the quarterly Financial Management Reporting 
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(FMR) pack, strengthening reporting of cash flow and cash balances at each 
level, promoting transparent breakdown of administration costs, and clearer 
linkages of transfer costs to caseload and payment cycle numbers (FRA 
Report, 2016).  
Arising from the foregoing, in 2017, UNICEF/WFP supported the Ministry in 
recruiting a national financial management expert, 10 provincial accountants 
and developing a financial management package for the SCT programme, 
which came with its own reporting guidelines and templates. All the personnel 
attached to the project were paid by donor funding (MCDSS/JAR, 2017).  
In addition, the UN pledged to provide programme oversight on the roll-out of 
payment service solution via ZANACO in Lusaka, Eastern and Central 
Provinces; support the National Registration Office to ensure all SCT 
beneficiaries have government issued identification cards and document 
processes to strengthen the programme during the phased roll-out (UNJSPP, 
2018).  
It is clear from this, that donors have great influence in the administration of 
the SCT programme including delivery processes.  In a way, this demonstrates 
what Arndt, et al., 2016, as cited by Nkhoma (2018), who argues that 
developing countries implementing cash transfers have a tendency of 
restricting financial resources to the actual transfers only, rather than 
improving the delivery systems to ensure effective implementation of the 
programme. It can all be seen here that without donor commitment, priorities 
would have been elsewhere, just like most other developing countries. Catubig 
et al. (2015), also admit that despite the extensive literature on the impact of 
cash transfers in various operational aspects, little attention is paid to program 
design, specifically on the evaluation of the different delivery mechanisms 
used. Going a little away from Zambia, to its neighboring country, Tanzania; 
the World Bank supported a Social Protection Payment assessment tool for 
cash delivery mechanism of the Productive Social Safety Net programme, 
which helped the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), identify what works 
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well and what could be improved. This showed another significance role of 
donors in ensuring improved service delivery (Lenneiye, 2006).   
According to Catubig et al, (2015), Political and other pressures usually imply 
that program operators have limited opportunities to assess alternative options 
other than relative costs and feasibility. Apart from supporting assessments, 
donors also participate in monitoring the implementation of the programme.  
2.11.2 What is the role of the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in 
the Delivery of SCTs? 
 
In most countries the world over, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), 
complement governments’ efforts in implementing poverty reduction 
programmes. Some CSOs are directly involved in the implementation of social 
protection programmes including social cash transfers. In Malawi for instance, 
four Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in partnership with Chitipa 
District Administration, collaborated in the implementation of a project called 
linking and learning, aimed at strengthening the social cash transfer 
programme in that country. Similarly, the Institute for Policy Research and 
Social Empowerment (IPRSE) led the process of conducting a baseline survey 
and implementing an action research to attain participatory problem 
identification in the social cash transfers; participatory solution development 
and impact assessment of key stakeholders from the state and non-state actors 
of society (Consolidated research report, 2011).   
In South Africa, CSOs also actively participate in advocacy, human rights and 
lobbying for the effective delivery of Social Grants by SASSA. This can be 
demonstrated by the Black Sash “Hands off our grants” Campaign of 2012, in 
response to KOOR (Katolieke Ontwikkeling Oranje Rivier) an NGO operating 
in the Northern Cape that alerted the Black Sash on the unauthorized debit 
deductions from SASSA-branded bank accounts of social grant beneficiaries 
(https://www.blacsash.org.za). This campaign prompted the then Minister of 
the Department of Social Development (DSD) Ms. Bathabile Dhlamini, to 
establish a Ministerial Task Team (MTT) to explore options to stop the 
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unauthorized, unlawful, fraudulent debit deductions from SASSA branded 
bank accounts (https://www.blacsash.org.za). Similarly, in Zambia, CSOs play 
a significant role in the advocacy for transparency and accountability in the 
implementation of Social Protection Programmes (SPPs). CSOs such as the 
Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) and Platform for Social Protection 
Zambia (PSP), also actively participated in the development of the National 
Social Protection Policy (MCDSS, 2014). As regards actual implementation of 
the programme, Care International was among CSOs that provided Technical 
Assistance in Kalomo, Chipata and Katete in the inception of the programme. 
Concern Worldwide (CW), on the other hand participated in the actual 
disbursements between 2016 and 2017 in what was known as Emergency 
Social cash Transfers (ESCT) in western and Southern Provinces of Zambia. 
CW used mobile money services (Mobile phones and short text messaging 
system- SMS) to disburse the funds to the beneficiaries. The lessons learnt 
were that some beneficiaries, instead of redeeming the cash with payment 
service providers upon receiving the SMS through their phones, they would 
delete the messages out of ignorance and illiteracy (MCDSS, 2018). CSOs 
play a major role in sensitising beneficiaries; monitoring and evaluation of 
programme performance including delivery systems and capacity building of 
grassroots structures such as CWACs. 
Summary: 
Different stakeholders view Social protection delivery mechanisms as a cost to 
Governments, yet an inevitable necessity. To most developing countries 
delivery systems can only hold as much value as their actual impact on the 
beneficiaries livelihood. The high poverty levels and the desire for 
Governments to have more poor people accessing social grants, puts the worth 
of investing in payment systems as secondary priority- Yet, with several 
benefits that a good payment system brings to a social protection programme 
such as reduced risks, timely payments and reduced trasaction costs to mention 
a few. The equation, however, remains in balance. Perhaps Governments 
should consider investing in social protection delivery mechanisms as a wise 
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financial investiment, but adopt systems within their investment capacity and 
country context. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.0 Social Cash Transfers a Case of Zambia 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter delves into the genesis of the SCT programme in Zambia, its 
administration and its impact on poverty.  
3.2  The Evolution of the Social Cash Transfer Scheme 
It was in 2003 that the Ministry of Community Development and Social 
Services with support from GIZ implemented a Social Safety Net project in the 
Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS), one of the oldest Social 
Assistance programmes in the Ministry, that social cash transfers were 
introduced in Kalomo. During the same time, a National Household Survey 
(NHS) was undertaken in 18 districts of Kafue, Luangwa, Kabwe, Chibombo, 
Mufulira, Chililabombwe, Nakonde, Mpika, Nchelenge, Kawambwa, Katete, 
Lundazi, Monze, Kalomo, Mongu, Kaoma, Kasempa and Solwezi, to generate 
reliable statistics for destitute households requiring welfare assistance. The 
Government had reduced funding to Ministries and Departments including 
social assistance programmes like PWAS, whose budget declined by 70 
percent. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) funding was also 
reduced by 58 percent.  Only K680 million was allocated to PWAS as 
Government funding while, K5 billion was HIPC funding (MCDSS, 2003).  
While there was significant reduction in funding generally, community-based 
welfare activities to do with HIV/AIDS and OVCs, supported by Donors such 
as UNICEF, GTZ and DANIDA increased. These agencies were also willing 
to continue supporting PWAS but demanded for policy direction to guarantee 
Government’s commitment to the HIPC framework and the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PSRP) of 2002 (MCDSS, 2003). By then, there was no reliable 
poverty data to assist in generating comprehensive budget plans and 
expenditures frameworks; hence the initiating of the NHS to establish numbers 
of households and individuals in need of regular support and minimum welfare 
transfers for survival. GTZ was also supporting another Consultancy in 
Kalomo, for the Pilot cash transfers, targeting the HIVAIDS affected people 
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and other extremely poor households. The objectives of this pilot project were 
to:  
i. Reduce extreme poverty, hunger and starvation in the 10 percent most 
destitute households in the pilot region, targeting about 1000 
households; 
ii. Focus mainly –but not exclusively-on households that were headed by 
the elderly and were caring for OVC because the breadwinners were 
chronically sick or had died due to HIV/AIDS or other reasons; 
iii. Generate information on the feasibility, costs and benefits and negative 
impacts of a social cash transfer scheme as a component of social 
protection strategy for Zambia (MCDSS, 2003). 
 
By then a 50Kg bag of maize which a standard family consumed per month 
was equivalent to $6 US. The targeted beneficiaries demanded for cash instead 
of the in-kind support through PWAS, considering that cash was more flexible, 
and they would spend it on things that they needed most.  The cash was to be 
multiplied by 12 months, but also to include 10 percent administrative costs. 
This brought the total to 80 US $ per household in a year. This arrangement 
was found to be more cost effective than that of providing relief food. This 
pilot project targeted 1000 incapacitated households in the initial stage with a 
total transfer budget being US$ 80,000 in a year. This became the birth of the 
social cash scheme in Zambia (MCDSS, 2003).  
The project was to scale up to the rest of the country, targeting 10 percent of 
the ultra-poor, based on lessons learnt from the primary data obtained from six 
(6) villages in Kalomo. This survey revealed that 10 percent of all households 
in that area were critically poor and urgently needed social assistance 
interventions as they were surviving on just one meal or nothing per day. 
Additionally, these people lacked employment and their children were 
deprived of most basic needs especially nutrition, medical services, clothing 
and education; whether they were orphans or not due to HIV/AIDS (Schubert, 
2005).   
The Pilot project adopted PWAS structures such as the DWAC and the 
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CWACs to discharge its activities as they were found to be effective in 
targeting the extreme poor and the labour constrained households. These 
structures were elaborate and driven by committees of volunteers at various 
levels starting from the community, ward and district levels, feeding into the 
nation’s governance hierarchy (Chiwele, 2010). Figure 4 below, demonstrates 
how the PWAS structure works. 
Figure: 4 PWAS Structure  in Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementation: CWACs, ACCs, Enumerators, PPM, DSWO, DWAC, PSWO, DSW HQ  
Coordination & Cooperation: CWACs, ACCS, DWAC, TWG, SAG-SP 
Source: Harmonized Manual of Operations MCDSS, (2016). Modified by the Author. 
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The Kalomo pilot project was designed to verify the hypothesis that: ‘A social 
cash transfer scheme was the most cost-effective approach to economically 
empower destitute and incapacitated households’ (MCDSS, 2006). 
The scheme started its initial activities based on the Draft Implementation 
Manual with a test phase from November 2003 to April 2004. The Test Phase 
was then evaluated, and the manual was approved leading into the official 
launch of the scheme by the then Minister of Community Development and 
Social Services, Marina Nsingo on 4th May 2004 (MCDSS, 2006).   
From May to November 2004, the scheme was rolled out to two agriculture 
blocks (Kalomo central and Kanchele) with 143 villages, 5 township sections 
with 11, 300 households (a population of approximately 70 thousand). By 
December 2004, the scheme had reached 6 area coordinating committees 
(ACCs), 39 CWACs, 21 Pay Points and an account was opened at the Finance 
Bank in Kalomo, for payment of monthly transfers to 1,027 household 
beneficiaries with a total population of 3,856 persons. One year later, the first 
round of retargeting was completed, and the number of beneficiary households 
reached 1,182 (MCDSS, 2006). 
3.3 Beneficiary Targeting  
 
Between 2003 and 2010, the scheme comprised five different models, all on 
pilot basis as follows: the ultra-poor approach (also known as the 10 percent 
inclusive model or IM). This aimed to cover the poorest 10 percent of the 
population of the districts served (Arruda and Dubois, 2018). During this 
period, a pilot Universal Pension Scheme (UPS), targeting the elderly people 
above 60 years of age and not in gainful employment was implemented in 
Katete District of the Eastern Province (Haabasonda, 2009). From 2010 to 
2014, the Social Cash Transfer scheme assumed two different streams with 
different characteristics: The Child Grant (CG) specifically aimed at benefiting 
households with children under the age of five (5) and the Multiple Category 
Transfer Grant (MCTG) which targeted other forms of vulnerability. The CG 
started with districts that had the highest child mortality rate. These included: 
Shangombo, Kalabo, Kaputa, Zambezi and Milenge, while, the MCTG 
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targeted all the extremely poor households with elderly people and orphans, or 
widows and orphans, as well as households having members with disabilities. 
The first three districts to be put on this model were Zambezi, Serenje and 
Luwingu (Arruda and Dubois, 2018).  
 
In 2014, the scheme, adopted the Harmonised targeting model with a single 
selection criterion (households with high dependency ratios), in 2016, the 
Inclusive Model was also introduced. This model aimed at giving the 
programme a national character, whilst scaling up to the rest of the country 
using a uniform targeting approach. All districts were to target households with 
the aged, the disabled, chronically ill on palliative care, female headed 
households with dependency ratio of at least three children or other dependents 
not in labour force ages i.e. 0 to 14 and 65 and above or (people who are either 
too young or too old to provide for themselves). Apart from incapacitation, 
eligible beneficiaries should be permanent residents of a community i.e. where 
the programme is being implemented and must have been living in that 
community for not less than 6 months (MCDSS, 2018).  
3.4  Implementation Cycle 
 
Before the SCT programme is introduced in an area, inception visits and 
sensitisation meetings are conducted by the Department of Social Welfare 
(DSW) to enlighten members of the community about the programme. During 
the meetings the eligibility criteria of the beneficiaries is explained and 
community structures such as CWACs are established. Figure 3 below, shows 
the sequence of the major activities in the implementation of Zambia’s SCTs. 
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Figure 3: SCT implementation Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MCDSS (2018) 
 
3.5 How does the CWAC System work in practice? 
 
The Community Welfare Assistance Committee (CWAC) is the lowest 
community-based structure in the implementation of the Social Cash Transfer 
programme in Zambia. Each CWAC takes care of about 400 households in its 
catchment area. Members of the CWAC are chosen by the community during 
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them potential beneficiaries who are interviewed and have their welfare status 
documented. This information is sent to Ministry Headquarters for further 
assessment and the approved list is sent back to the community for validation 
before eligible beneficiaries are finally recruited for payments. Validation is 
done at community meetings, organized by the CWAC and community 
leaders, but supervised by DSWOs. The validated applications are then sent to 
the Area Coordinating Committee (ACC) which is the immediate higher level 
after the CWAC, for onward submission to the DSWO. [The ACC coordinates 
5 to 10 CWACs. ACCs are in turn coordinated by the District Welfare 
Assistance Committee (DWAC) whose membership is drawn from Government 
Departments, Local Authorities, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Faith 
Based Organisations (FBOs) at district level.] After the validated lists have 
been received by the DSWO, they are further verified and then submitted to 
the DWAC for final approval and submission to national office in Lusaka 
where the national data base is hosted. This process is modified from time to 
time (MCDSS, 2006).  
 
Since 2017, enumeration has been done using Mobile Technology (M-Tech) or 
computer tablets. Before then, this process was done manually using a 
questionnaire.  
After enumeration, the data is exposed to a proxy means test (PMT) to 
determine who meets the criteria.  According to Grosh and Baker (1995), 
information on household or individual characteristics, correlating with 
welfare levels is used in a formal procedure to proxy household income, 
welfare or need; the poorest tops the list.  
Once eligible beneficiaries are identified and funding is released by MCDSS, 
payments are done through PPMs or Payment Service Providers (PSP) 
depending on the payment mechanism applicable in an area. PPMs and their 
Deputies are recruited by the DSWO in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Education or Health. These officials are on part time basis since they are 
already employees of other line Ministries. The District Education Board 
Secretaries (DEBS) identify teachers that can be trusted with the responsibility 
55 
 
of making SCT payments on behalf of the Ministry; these are the ones who 
become PPMs.  
Whenever the PPM is absent from the station, he/she completes the stipulated 
Form and send his/her deputy with the Form to the DSWO. The Form 
authorizes the assistant PPM to perform the functions of the PPM for a given 
period (Revised SCT Operations Manual, 2016). As and when necessary, the 
Ministry of Health, also identifies its own trusted officers to serve as PPMs in 
areas where teachers are unavailable to provide this service. PPMs are trained 
for one week, to understand how payments are conducted and what 
documentation is used or is to be generated in the process. Before PPMs and 
their deputies commence their functions, they sign Agreement forms as at 
Appendix 6, which outline the dos and don’ts and they are assisted to open the 
Pay Point Account at the nearest recognised commercial bank.  
Ordinarily, funds are supposed to be released on bi-monthly basis by MCDSS 
to the districts, while DSWOs across the country inform PPMs to collect 
cheques from the DSWO for both the Transfers and Administration of the 
programme in their catchment areas. The programme provides for 10 percent 
of the funds on administrative cost, while 90 percent is for the actual transfers 
to the beneficiaries (PIM, 2016).  There, however, has been a lot of 
inconsistencies in the actual funding releases to the programme especially 
between 2016 and 2018 (MCDSS, 2018).  
Upon encashment of the cheques, however, PPMs physically carry the money 
to the Pay Point for payment. CWACs are notified to inform the beneficiaries 
about the payment due dates. Beneficiaries either go to the pay points 
themselves to collect their money or send authorised proxies with their 
National Registration Cards (NRCs). Each PPM pays between 60 and 70 
beneficiaries a day and carters for at least two CWACs on average (MCDSS, 
2018).  The programme provides for the right to delegate access to the 
transfers to another trusted person or deputy to help the weak/elderly/disabled 
heads of households who have difficulties in getting to the pay point (MO, 
2006).  
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Table 7 below, shows the trends in the actual collection of the payments. 
Table 7: Transfer Recipients 
Who actually collects the money from 
the pay point? 
  
  Frequency Percent 
Self (beneficiary) 50 83.3 
Deputy 10 16.7 
Total 60 100 
 
 
Figure 9 presents the trends shown in table 6 by percentage. 
Figure 9: SCT Recipients by Percentage 
 
 
From Figure 9, it can be deduced that, most of the beneficiaries collect the 
transfers themselves at 83 percent, while only 17 percent send proxies. 
 
While delegating the collection of the money to proxies is allowed, the method 
is not reliable in practice as records show that some deputies are used by more 
than one client and in some instances, deputies are also beneficiaries, which is 
not allowed in the programme guide. Some dishonest people also take 
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advantage of the vulnerable clients by giving them less than the money they 
have collected (Wonani, 2018). This scenario poses a risk to the programme 
especially in the absence of a robust payment tracking system. The use of 
NRCs without a biometric identification system is unreliable because client’s 
images are not verified.  
According to Anonymous (2018), sometimes clients only present the 
identification numbers on a piece of paper without showing the NRC to the 
PPM, relying on their familiarity with each other as members of the same 
community with the PPM.  
During payments, CWAC members witness the proceedings. For this, they too 
are paid an allowance of ZMW 50 (US$5) per day per member. Usually two 
CWAC members witness the payments per day. The members take turns in 
pairs when witnessing the payments. The programme provides for payments to 
be conducted in three consecutive days at each Pay Point (MCDSS, 2018). 
All the recipients or their proxies sign or thumb print on a payment schedule to 
acknowledge receipt of payment as at Appendix 8. Some PPMs carter for 
more than one pay point including what are known as mobile pay points where 
PPMs take the transfers to areas closer to beneficiaries’ villages, to ensure that 
everyone is paid. This arrangement, however, in some instances makes PPMs 
cover distances as far as 40 kilometres or more. If a beneficiary does not 
collect the money, the unclaimed funds are forfeited to the state (MCDSS, 
2018). According to the Manual of Operations (2006), PPMs are expected to 
redeposit all the uncollected funds into the DWAC Account at the end of the 
payment exercise.  
While this option may seem to be a reasonable safety measure, it is however, 
susceptible to manipulation just like Senior Social Welfare Officer Kakubo 
Wonani puts it:  
“There is high risk for such funds as they can easily be stolen 
especially that most of the beneficiaries are illiterate and sign using 
thumb prints which anyone can do.” 
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Anonymous (2018), however, observes that some PPMs are so good that when 
they discover that some of their beneficiaries have not collected their money 
on the scheduled days, they follow them all the way to their villages to go and 
pay them.  It is only when this completely fails that the uncollected funds are 
redeposited into the programme account. Nearly all the PPMs interviewed by 
this researcher said that they have had to return some unclaimed funds before. 
It is therefore important for DSWOs to ensure that CWACs are informed in 
time about the payments and monitor the payment process consistently.  
Once the payment exercise is over, the PPM prepares a report and financial 
returns stating how much money was collected the previous month, what was 
paid out and what was not claimed with payment schedules endorsed by 
CWAC members as at Appendix 11, for submission to the DSWO who is 
their immediate supervisor in this arrangement.  
CWACs also produce their own reports stating their observations about the 
payments.  
Apart from witnessing the payments and participating in the enumeration 
process of beneficiaries, CWACs are also entrusted with the responsibility of 
monitoring the actual utilisation of the grants by the beneficiaries (MCDSS, 
2018).  
According to the Revised SCT Manual of Operation (2016) Beneficiary 
households found to be misusing the grants on alcohol or other negative vices 
shall be warned and counselled by the CWAC, if the problem persists, they 
shall be deregistered or have their support discontinued immediately, though 
such information is hard to come by due to poor record keeping, but there are 
scanty unverified stories about some beneficiaries misusing the money in 
different communities (MCDSS, 2018). According to Schubert (2005), more 
than 90 percent of the CWACs perform their functions in accordance with the 
Manual of Operations as per their training. 
Generally, there have been very few disciplinary cases involving PPMs, 
although some have been dismissed before, for pilfering like earlier mentioned 
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under problem statement in this study (Chapter One). The Ministry does not 
however, have a comprehensive record of such cases. 
3.5.1 Change of Deputy for Household 
 
There are various reasons why one would want to replace a deputy for a 
household; however, the appointment of a deputy is somewhat, permanent and 
cannot be easily changed. According to the Revised SCT Manual of 
Operations (2016), a deputy can only be replaced in case of fraud on his/her 
part or when the deputy is no longer available. This is done in consultation 
with the CWAC. In such an exceptional case, the CWAC uses the deputy form 
to state the reason why a deputy is removed and whether the household wishes 
to appoint somebody else. 
3.5.2 Replacement of PPM or Deputy PPM 
The turnover of PPMs is somewhat, high in many pay points. According to 
Janet Nkausu an Assistant Social Welfare Officer in Rufunsa, one common 
challenge faced by the programme is the turnover of PPMs.  
 “Being full time employees of other Ministries, PPMs and their 
deputies usually get transferred to other places and get replaced. 
Whenever there is such a development, the official handover takes 
place in the District Social Welfare Office where the PPM’s file is 
checked for completeness; Missing forms are replaced, and the new 
PPM is briefed about his or her new responsibilities. The DSWO 
makes sure that the new PPM is well oriented and can perform the 
tasks and confirms that he or she has received all the necessary 
information and agrees to adhere to the rules spelled out in the 
Agreement form” (Nkausu, 2018)  
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Figure 5 below shows the participatory process from the identification of 
beneficiaries to the payment of the grant.  
Figure 5: Simplified flow Chart of the Participative targeting, approval and Payment           
Process. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme- Kalomo District (2006). 
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CWACs, play a critical role in ensuring data quality because any erroneous 
information captured to the system and subsequently transmitted to the central 
server can only be rectified by the DSW at MCDSS-HQ.  
3.7  Administrative costs 
 
CWAC and ACC receive an administrative fund to enable them maintain 
bicycles which are given to each CWAC member as an incentive to facilitate 
transport as they carry out their duties in communities, to buy stationery; pens 
and some refreshments during meetings.  The treasurer of the CWACs and 
ACCs also receive ZMK 100 (US$10) every other month (bi-monthly), 
provided that the CWACs / ACCs have handed in their monitoring reports to 
the district. CWACs and ACCs are expected to keep record of how they are 
spending the money with consent from all executive members by endorsement 
(Revised SCT Manual of Operations, 2016). The implication of the rapid scale 
up is that these community structures were also increased in number thereby 
increasing administrative costs on the programme (MCDSS, 2018). It was 
however not easy to obtain the actual cost implications of this development on 
the programme from the Ministry Headquarters due to poor record keeping.  
 
As at April 2018, 574,663 households countrywide were receiving SCTs (this 
translated into about 3 million beneficiary household members at 5.1 average 
household sizes) (LCMS, 2015). Appendix 5 shows social cash transfer 
beneficiaries by district. 
3.8  Impact of Social Cash Transfers (SCTs) 
According to the Impact Evaluations done by the Ministry, Social Cash 
Transfers in Zambia, have demonstrated that SCTs   
i. Reduce extreme poverty by 5.4 percentage points  
ii. Improve school enrollment and attendance, 
iii. Improve household food security, there was also 19 percentage points 
increase in the number of households eating more than one meal a day;  
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iv. 21 percentage points increase in livestock owned by beneficiary 
households; 
Improve the local economy and for each 1 kwacha given out, the 
transfer value generates seventy-nine ngwee (multiplier effect) i.e. 1:79 
(MCDSS, 2018). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.0 ANALYSIS OF ZAMBIA’S SCT PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
 
This Chapter is divided into two parts. The first part explores literature on the 
background of the three delivery systems specifically used in the payment of 
Social Cash Transfers in Zambia. It also gives an insight of how these systems 
are funded and how they function.  The second part identifies and justifies the 
variables employed in the study. The paper attracts both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence of the delivery systems currently in use. 
4.1 Background of the delivery systems 
 
It was when the SCT programme was still in its infancy that the manual 
payment system was adopted in Kalomo. By then the caseload of beneficiaries 
was only 1,027 households. Thirteen (13) years later in 2016 however, when 
the national caseload reached 242,000 in a total of 78 districts; with potential 
for further scale up to the entire country, MCDSS advertised for alternative 
Payment Service Providers. This was largely prompted by the preceding 
Fiduciary Risk Assessment (FRA) reports that had recommended for the need 
to have more secure and efficient payment solutions to the programme 
(MCDSS, 2018).  
 
4.1.1 The three SCT delivery Systems used in Zambia 
 
As at 2019, the three Social Cash Transfer delivery systems recognised in 
Zambia, were: The Manual, Electronic and the Post Office. 
 
4.2 Manual Payment System 
When the programme just started, its design was that upon identification of 
beneficiaries, funds from the source were to be deposited in a commercial 
bank within Kalomo. At that time, funds were deposited in Finance Bank and 
beneficiaries were expected to open savings accounts and withdraw as and 
when they so wished to, once the funds were credited to their accounts. Few 
beneficiaries managed to open accounts, due to high illiteracy levels and the 
64 
 
challenge of distance from the villages to the Bank. It was for that reason, that 
schools and health centres were the preferred pay points and that civil servants 
working in these institutions be the pay officers or Pay Point Managers 
(PPMs) as they became to be known as (MCDSS/GTZ, 2007).  
The rationale behind choosing these government employees was that these 
officers travelled routinely (every month end), to the district capital to collect 
their own salaries; therefore, as they went for their pay, they would use the 
same time to withdraw the money for SCT beneficiaries (MCDSS/GTZ, 
2007).  
PPMs are however, entitled to a meal allowance or a Daily Subsistence 
Allowance (DSA), when it takes them more than eight (8) hours away from 
their duty station to and from the bank or when they must spend a night away 
from their duty station respectively. This is the case every bi-monthly when 
funding is released for payments and PPMs must go to the District Office to 
collect the cheques or when performing any other SCT function away from 
their duty station. At the time of this study, the meal allowance was ZMW 
85.00 (US$8.5), while the DSA varied from district to district based on 
government designated rates and salary scale of the PPM (but ranged from 
ZMW350.00 (US$35) to ZMW800.00 (US$80), (MCDSS, 2018).  
The arrangement is that at district level, there is a separate account for the 
transfers and administrative funds. Funds for the transfers and administrative 
costs are expected to be transferred every bi-monthly by the Ministry 
Headquarters in Lusaka to every district for onward transmission to pay points 
by cheque (MCDSS, 2018).  
At the inception of the programme, beneficiaries were receiving the transfers 
on a monthly basis, but from November 2007 onwards; payments were 
changed to a bimonthly rhythm in order to reduce transaction costs and to help 
beneficiary households make investments. Funds from both the Government 
(GRZ) and donors use the same channel of delivery (MCDSS/GTZ, 2007). 
Figure 6 below shows how funds move from the source to the district 
accounts. 
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Figure 6: Social Cash Transfer Funds Floor 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Harmonised Manual of Operations (2016)  
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Figure 7: SCT Payment Process 
 
Source: MCDSS (2018) 
Figure 7 above shows how funds move from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
to MCDSS and to the beneficiaries, while Figure 8 below, shows the various 
funding levels both by the Government and Donors. 
Figure 8: SCT Funding Levels 
 
Source: MCDSS (2018). 
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Every pay point has an account at the bank of which 10 percent of the money 
is for the administration of the programme; the rest (90 percent) is for transfers 
from each allocation (Manual of Operations, 2006). According to MCDSS 
(2018), Part of administrative funds goes towards supporting CWACs in 
witnessing the payment process, dissemination of information and monitoring 
the utilisation of the transfers by beneficiaries. 
The maximum amount of cash allowed to be withdrawn by the PPM per day 
from the bank, is ZMW 25,000 (US$ 2,500), except with authority from the 
DWAC.  ZMW 25,000 translates into about 140 recipients paid at ZMW180 
bi-monthly at a rate of ZMW 90 per month. The average total number of 
recipients per PPM, however, is 120 (MCDSS, 2018). The limited amount 
allowed to be cashed from the bank per day, means that PPMs must arrange 
phased pay days or stay close to the Bank a little longer (especially PPMs from 
remote pay points), to withdraw enough money for the beneficiaries. This 
poses a lot of risk.   
According to MO (2006), Pay Points carter for a catchment area of 8 
kilometres radius. In some instances, however, beneficiaries travel longer 
distances to access their money as they do not actually live within this 
catchment area. In Mongu, out of 60 beneficiaries in one CWAC, 24 said it 
took them between thirty minutes to one hour to get to the pay point while 20 
said it took them more than one hour and 10 said they were not sure. Only 6 
said it took them less than 30 minutes. When the same beneficiaries were 
asked what challenges, they faced in accessing their money, 24 said the pay 
point was far, representing 40 percent, while 60 percent was distributed among 
those that complained of delayed payments at 36.7 percent and other reasons. 
Table 6 below, shows the pattern of the common challenges faced by 
beneficiaries when receiving the grants. These and other challenges make 
beneficiaries unable to collect their money. 
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Table 6: Common challenges faced by beneficiaries in accessing payments 
Challenges faced when  collecting  money 
  Frequency Percent 
The pay point is far 24 40 
Delayed payments 22 36.7 
Nothing 10 16.7 
Other specify 4 6.7 
Total 60 100 
 
Other challenges included rudeness of some payment officers especially from 
ZAMPOST.  
4.2.1 Uncollected Funds 
 
In Chapter three we observed that if funds are not collected by the intended 
beneficiaries, such funds are forfeited to the state. It is however, worth noting 
that there are various reasons why funds end up not being collected from pay 
points apart from what has already been mentioned. One of the reasons include 
the death of a beneficiary or shifting of the beneficiary to another location 
without informing the CWAC or the PPM. These social grants are not 
transferrable. Other common reason is that of having duplicate names or 
duplicated national identification numbers. It is the role of the Data Officer to 
ensure that beneficiary registers are updated on regular basis to avoid 
duplication and ghost beneficiaries. The Management Information System 
(MIS) guidelines and other best practices, emphasise that application controls 
should ensure accuracy and completeness to avoid duplication of records 
(MCDSS, 2018).  
Poor record keeping can pose a high risk to abuse as any ineligible beneficiary 
can easily take advantage and access the money illegally. Management should, 
therefore, ensure that duplicate and ineligible beneficiaries’ names are 
constantly removed from the data base. Whenever a household dissolves or a 
beneficiary shifts to another area, transfers are discontinued.  Whenever the 
household head status changes, the situation of the household is reviewed and 
the DSWO decides whether transfers should continue or be discontinued.  
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Re-assessment of beneficiaries is conducted every three (3) years and it is only 
when a decision has been made to remove existing households off the 
programme that new households are included. Households that have 
graduated, weaned off and exiting from the scheme receive a bonus of 20% of 
the total transfers for three years. Deputies for households as well as for PPMs 
can be changed if need arises (Harmonised Manual of Operations, 2016).  
When a beneficiary dies, the household remains eligible for three cycles (6 
months), unless there is another member in that household who meets the 
selection criterial, otherwise retargeting is done, though not closely followed 
due to poor record keeping (MCDSS, 2018).  
On a positive note, some PPMs interviewed disclosed that their role on the 
SCT programme has afforded them an opportunity to acquire counselling 
skills which help them work just like Social Workers when dealing with their 
clients.  
Christine Makumba of Chinyunyu Pay point in Rufunsa said: 
“I have learnt to be more patient and tolerant than I used to be; some 
of my clients can be so aggressive and rude that they shout at me and 
complain bitterly when funds are delayed like I do it deliberately. I just 
keep assuring them in the politest way possible. I understand that these 
people have nowhere to get help from, hence the impatience and the 
high tempers, it is from this money that they buy food and support their 
families.”  
Whereas most PPMs are generally friendly and helpful, there are some that do 
not have “a big heart” for clients as Belita Sakala (Not real name) a female 
headed household from Chadiza District of the Eastern Province of Zambia 
once narrated her ordeal as follows:  
“Sometimes we are given very short notice by the pay officers, by the 
time you know it, it is too late. One day, in the rainy season, I 
happened to have gone to the miller in the nearby village. I had just 
gotten back home when my daughter came panting from school saying 
she had seen my friends getting paid and so, I needed to go and get my 
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portion as well. We badly needed the money to pay for my daughter’s 
examination fees. The pay point is far, and I was tired, so I got my 
identification card and gave bit to my daughter to go and collect the 
money for me. The girl ran all the way to the pay point. When she 
presented the card, she was told that she had brought a wrong card, a 
voter’s card instead of the National Registration Card (NRC). My 
daughter tried to plead with him but to no avail. So, my daughter hired 
a bicycle and promised to pay the owner after collecting the money. 
When she got home, I fetched the NRC and gave it to her, the bicycle 
man took her back to the pay point only to find that the pay officer had 
closed the pay point and he was gone after announcing that that was 
the last day for payments and that the uncollected money would be 
returned to the bank. I never got paid and my daughter came back 
home disappointed, tired and drenched in the rain. I had to plead with 
the bicycle man that I will still pay when I have the money.” (This story 
was shared by a beneficiary in Chadiza during the Joint Annual Review 
(JAR), field visit attended by this researcher in June 2018).  
 
Therefore, reliable and flexible delivery systems are essential to the successful 
implementation of programmes like this one. It is important to bear in mind 
that, while some PPMs are kind there are those that are not. 
 
Kennedy Mumba puts it this way: 
“Human beings are not the same, some may be good hearted, but one 
should always bear in mind those that are completely way off. While 
some of the challenges faced by the programme are to do with lack of 
institutional capacity to effectively monitor the programme, we also do 
not rule out those who just have bad attitude, but entrusted with the 
responsibility to serving others,” (Mumba, 2018). 
 
It is therefore; important to take precautions when serving the needy as they 
often times remain silent when their rights are violated. Pay officers should be 
carefully selected and trained on how to handle vulnerable clients. In Rufunsa, 
one PPM had this to say:  
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“Our core business is to help and not to benefit from the allowances 
only. I have seen how these people suffer and cherish the little that they 
receive, if I was rich, I would have started giving out some of my own 
money to help the less privileged, it affects me very much when the 
transfers are delayed and these people keep asking when they will be 
paid” (Kapito, 2018). 
 
The delays are often caused by the late releases of the grants by the national 
treasury, although some PSPs also contribute to the delay due to internal 
administrative processes and bureaucracies (MCDSS, 2018). 
On the other hand, some PPMs also claim to have learned other skills 
including accounting and report writing, which are not their core functions. 
But, Mwale a PPM of Chiyota pay point also in Rufunsa says: 
“While there are all these gains from participating on this programme, 
we sometimes fear for our lives too. When the community knows 
beforehand that you have gone to the bank… all the eyes are on your 
route, staring to see when you will be back; know what? You can be 
attacked! It is therefore safer for the community to be kept in the dark 
until the day of payment, though sometimes information leaks.” 
 
Like it has been said, physical movement of money from the bank to the Pay 
Point poses a risk, though no attacks on PPMs have been reported in Rufunsa.  
When asked whether there were temptations in handling huge sums of money 
that did not necessarily belong to him, Anonymous (2018) in Rufunsa said:  
“Yes, temptations are there, especially when the transfers come before 
your own pay day, but when you remember that the money you are 
carrying is for the less privileged, you hold back. To them that is their 
only hope. At least for us we are assured of a salary at the month end; 
besides if I steal, I will lose employment and make my whole family 
suffer.” “(PPM)” 
In a different scenario in Lusaka, another Anonymous said:  
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“When we had cholera between January and April 2018, it was a big 
challenge to pay using the manual system as people were not allowed 
to gather. If there is no outbreak, things seem normal with the manual 
system; but when there is an epidemic, you see the need to have options 
to this system.” “(MCDSS)” 
From all this, apart from security concerns, the manual system has other 
challenges. It can be time consuming with increased caseloads and be a health 
hazard during epidemics.  
 
4.3 Electronic payment System 
 
Following the recommendations of the Fiduciary Risk Assessment report of 
2015, the Ministry advertised for a Payment Service Provider (PSP) with the 
intention of introducing an electronic payment system. According to MCDSS 
(2017), Only ZANACO responded to the advert. In this regard, the Ministry 
sought a no objection to direct bid ZANACO, which was partly a government 
owned bank to be contracted for the job. The contract was signed in 2016 and 
ZANACO was tasked to commence payments in three provinces namely: 
Eastern, Lusaka and Central on pilot basis for a period of three years, after 
which an evaluation would be conducted to determine whether the services 
could be scaled up to other parts of the country or not.  ZANACO was engaged 
on grounds that it had the capacity to introduce E-payment services including 
the use of ATMs to improve the security of the funds and promote efficiency 
in the programme (MCDSS, 2018). ZANACO only commenced real activities 
in Lusaka in May 2017, starting with training of trainers (TOT) workshops for 
DSWOs to orient beneficiaries on the use of ATM cards. This was found to be 
necessary because most of the beneficiaries were going to be using the ATM 
visa cards for the first time.  
ZANACO also undertook a mapping exercise of beneficiary locations, bank 
branches and Express Agents and then commenced the card production 
process. After training over 90 percent, the beneficiaries (including CWACs) 
in communities, all the beneficiaries with National Registration Cards (NRC) 
were issued with ATM visa cards. Only about 500 beneficiaries did not have 
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the national identification cards and so they were not issued with the ATM 
cards. These were to continue receiving their transfers through PPMs. Soon the 
beneficiaries were sensitized on how to use ATM cards and received their first 
payment through ATMs in the July/August bi-monthly cycle of 2017.  
At that time, the transfer value had just been increased from and ZMW 70 
(US$7) to ZMW 90 (US$9) per month (or ZMW 180 (US$18) to ZMW to 
ZMW 360 (US$36) for disabled clients and ZMW 140 (US$14) to ZMW 280 
(US$28) bi-monthly for other categories of vulnerability), (MCDSS, 2017).  
The beneficiaries were very excited to use the ATM cards as it gave them the 
freedom to withdraw their money at their convenient time and pay point. For 
some, the excitement was however short-lived as they soon started losing the 
ATM cards and forgetting their Personal Identification Numbers (PINs), 
(MCDSS, 2018).  
According to an Officer who opted to remain anonymous at Lusaka District 
Office, 59 beneficiaries had lost their ATM cards or forgotten their PINs by the 
second cycle of getting paid via ATMs.  
According to ZANACO (2017), however, the Visa card was chosen in order to 
promote a culture of saving among the beneficiaries as it afforded them an 
opportunity to only withdraw amounts, they needed at a time, unlike the 
manual system where uncollected funds were forfeited to the state.  
As at 2018, only a total of 3,193 beneficiaries out of a caseload of 11,318 or 28 
percent of the recipients were using ATM cards in Lusaka. The remaining ones 
were still being paid by PPMs.  
In each cycle, ZANACO allows beneficiaries to withdraw or check account 
balances twice from any of its branches or agents using the visa card for free. 
After the grace period, the account attracts a fee just like any other ordinary 
Bank account (MCDSS, 2018).  
While this system appears to be better organized than the manual system, it has 
its own challenges including that of cards being captured by the cashing 
machine, loss or destruction of visa cards by beneficiaries and forgetting of 
PINs. To make matters worse; it takes very long for the Bank to replace the 
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cards once they are lost or destroyed. Further, this type of account does not 
allow beneficiaries to access money over the counter, which means that if a 
card is lost or destroyed, the option is to wait for replacement or resort to the 
manual system. As at 2018, the Ministry was in consultation with the bank to 
find better options. Meanwhile over 350 beneficiaries at the time of this study 
were waiting to have their misplaced or damaged cards replaced by ZANACO 
(MCDSS, 2018). With this kind of dilemma, one would agree with Hrebiniak 
(2006) who contends that the problem with poor performance in programmes 
does not entirely depend on planning, but rather with doing. Hrebiniak (2006) 
believes that making strategy work is more important than strategy making. 
What is seen here is that MCDSS, found it suitable to engage this PSP to 
improve delivery of SCTs, but whether all the preconditions were met, remains 
unanswered.  
This researcher is therefore, compelled to conclude that programme failure is 
also caused by poor implementation strategies and lack of seriousness by the 
implementers rather than actual planning. It is difficult to understand why the 
same bank can have accounts that allow some clients to access funds both with 
the ATM cards and over the counter, while the same services cannot be 
available for the poor. Why in this era when technology is highly advanced, 
replacement of ATM cards should take months? Why would the accounts of 
the neediest people be so problematic? To make matters worse, the cash 
transfer account cannot be used for any other purposes than the cash transfers; 
therefore, even if a well-wisher was to donate some money to a beneficiary, 
such is unattainable through this account (MCDSS, 2018).   
The complications surrounding visa cards by the illiterate, makes unscrupulous 
people take advantage of the situation and steal from those that seek help. 
According to Anonymous (2018), during the transition from the manual 
system to the electronic one by ZANACO, a named PPM was caught stealing 
money from beneficiaries’ accounts. When distributing the visa cards to the 
beneficiaries at his pay point, he managed to access the PINs as well and 
helped himself to the ‘transfers,’ he was apprehended. In some instances, 
people, trusted by the illiterate, the aged or the blind beneficiaries to collect the 
money on their behalf using visa cards, end up stealing it or part of it 
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(Anonymous, 2018). The other challenge with ZANACO is that they take long 
to credit beneficiary accounts with SCT funds. As a result, there are many 
instances when the Bank pays late compared with the manual payment 
schedule despite the funds being released at the same time by the Ministry. 
Anonymous (2018) says:   
“Sometimes we think that ZANACO does not prioritize cash 
transfers because it does not have a competitor. It sometimes 
takes them two or more weeks to credit beneficiary accounts, 
this is usually after PPMs have even finished paying. Something 
needs to be done!” “(MCDSS)” 
One outstanding concern about ZANACO is that it had taken them over two 
years to scale up its electronic payment services to Central and Eastern 
Provinces that were also in the contract. In Lusaka where they had started 
from, after two years; the Bank was only at 28 percent coverage by 2018, 
despite its acclaimed infrastructure capacity.  One would agree with 
Anonymous (2018), who suggests that perhaps ZANACO needed real 
competitors to jerk them up.  
ZANACO has sometimes issued inactivated ATM visa cards to beneficiaries, 
thereby making it difficult for them to access the money on schedule. Another 
major weakness with the Bank was that it was fond of transferring its 
employees assigned to the SCT programme. This created problems and caused 
delays in getting things done, as new people required ample time to learn how 
the system worked. To make matters worse, ZANACO did not attend to 
individual beneficiaries’ grievances as they claimed that the contract was 
between the Ministry and the Bank and not with SCT beneficiaries.  
It is therefore the responsibility of the Ministry to compile and submit all 
queries or complaints to the bank for consideration.  
“This lack of direct contact between the Bank and the beneficiaries 
makes some beneficiaries prefer the manual system to the electronic 
one as PPMs provide direct feedback; unlike the case is with 
ZANACO.” (Anonymous, 2018).  “(MCDSS)” 
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The arrangement with ZANACO was that when funds were not claimed by 
beneficiaries for six months (Three cycles), such funds should be reimbursed 
to the Ministry, though at the time of this study there were no records of such 
reimbursed funds at the Ministry (MCDSS, 2018).  
All planning was done between the Ministry Headquarters and the Bank; 
DSWOs and PSWOs were not involved, but only received instructions. This 
had negative implications on the programme, as most of the decisions were 
based on assumptions (Anonymous, 2018). It would, therefore, be important 
and beneficial for DSWOs and PSWOs to participate in the planning process 
especially, when designing delivery systems as Anonymous (2018) puts it:  
“We are the ones who interact directly and routinely with the 
beneficiaries and we understand the issues better than those who base 
their decisions on reports, which pass through long bureaucratic 
processes; some information gets distorted.” “(MCDSS)” 
It appears, all the SCT beneficiaries under Lusaka District can easily be 
absorbed by the electronic payment system, but for the rural towns, the manual 
system could be the best option. 
4.4 ZAMPOST Payment System 
When the Ministry advertised for PSPs in 2015, ZAMPOST did not bid. Two 
years later, however, after ZANACO had commenced its initial payments in 
Lusaka, ZAMPOST approached the Ministry to lobby for business as a 
payment solution. Considering that, ZANACO was engaged to service three 
provinces only according to its contract; the Ministry saw it wise to introduce 
another PSP, especially that ZAMPOST was equally a Government institution. 
A no objection was therefore, sought from ZPPA to direct bid ZAMPOST as 
well and authority was granted (MCDSS, 2018). 
On 21st August 2017, the contract between the Ministry and ZAMPOST was 
signed in Lusaka and was officially launched on 4th September 2017, by the 
then Minister of Community Development and Social Services Honourable 
Emerine Kabanshi MP.  
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ZAMPOST was contracted to make payments only in Luapula and Western 
Provinces on pilot basis too; with a view to roll out to other parts of the 
country, depending on its performance.  These two provinces were chosen 
mainly because of their high poverty levels and correspondingly challenging 
geographical terrain. The PSP sought for this terrain, therefore, needed to have 
the capability to make SCT payments within a radius of not more than 8 
kilometers par pay point (MCDSS, 2017). 
ZAMPOST was contracted on the following objectives: 
i. To design a cost effective, accessible and secure system for 
reliable and timely delivery of regular payments to Social cash 
transfer programme recipients in all the districts of Luapula 
and Western Province; 
ii. To timely deliver cash payments to cash transfer programme 
beneficiaries in districts of Luapula and Western Province. 
 
Specifically, the scope of work included: designing and implementing a 
payment system that achieved the two objectives above. It also included 
working with the Ministry to agree on a simple and easily implementable 
payment solution, case management process including a complaint handling 
mechanism; defining the rights and responsibilities of recipients about 
payments in agreement with the Ministry; liaising with the Ministry before bi-
monthly beneficiary payments on the number of beneficiary households to be 
paid. ZAMPOST was to inform the DSWOs in respective districts of receipt of 
funds and commencement dates for payments, deliver cash grants to the 
beneficiary households within 14 days of receipt of funds to be witnessed by  
CWAC members, provide information on the payments and prepare 
reconciliation reports for the Ministry within seven days after each payment 
cycle; submit formal bi-monthly reports (both accountable and non-
accountable) to the Ministry in accordance with the type and nature of reports 
required by the Ministry; cooperate fully with an annual review and audit of 
the programme by providing information and access to designated Officers as 
requested in a timely fashion and provide an enabling environment for 
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beneficiary households to easily access payments also bearing in mind 
disability sensitivity (MCDSS, 2018).  
 
4.4.1 Justification for Hiring ZAMPOST 
 
According to MCDSS (2017), direct bidding of ZAMPOST was an important 
option for administering Social Cash Transfers due to the following reasons: 
i. ZAMPOST was a Government institution with wide geographical 
coverage in terms of presence in the remotest parts of the country 
through its nationwide post office network; 
ii. Government was reviewing its policy in the use of pay point managers 
(PPMs) as this strategy was associated with a lot of risks through the 
dispensing of huge sums of cash, as such; the use of established 
institutions such as ZAMPOST were deemed to be safer options; 
iii. Since ZAMPOST was a Public Entity, Government envisaged making 
savings in terms of administrative costs in view of the leverage to 
negotiate minimal fees for the service. 
 
4.4.2 Deliverables 
The following were the deliverables assigned to ZAMPOST in the contract: 
a) To pay beneficiaries of the SCT on behalf of the Ministry in 
line with the contract received from the Ministry; 
b) To effectively manage and process the bi-monthly payment lists 
and ensure timely payments to intended beneficiaries within 72 
hours of receipts of the funds from the Ministry; 
c) To facilitate for the voluntary savings and investment Banking 
Services at prevailing interest rates of return to beneficiaries; 
d) To facilitate opening of zero charge for the beneficiaries with 
no activity charges; 
e) To avail its countrywide Post Offices for payment of SCTs as 
well as provide mobile payments services in areas mutually 
identified with the Ministry; 
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f) To avail monthly reports to the Ministry by the 14th day of the 
following month; 
g) To facilitate financial literacy and entrepreneurship training 
programmes to SCT beneficiaries during the tenure of the 
agreement (MCDSS, 2017). 
ZAMPOST, however, faced three major challenges in designing and 
implementing its payment system, these included: (1) poor infrastructure 
coverage, (2) high illiteracy levels and unfamiliarity of the beneficiaries with 
savings procedures and (3) how to simplify the payment process and minimize 
the risks involved (MCDSS, 2017). 
It was further observed that the Ministry did not conduct due diligence on 
ZAMPOST before hiring it as this was evidenced by the challenges that the 
institution faced soon after it being contracted. Instead of introducing the 
electronic delivery system as agreed in the contract; ZAMPOST started using 
its own workers to make payments manually just like PPMs. Instead of using 
people from its local Post Offices in its district branches, ZAMPOST resorted 
to sending staff from its Head office in Ndola on the Copperbelt Province 
(Hundreds of kilometres away) to go and physically pay in Luapula and 
Western Provinces. This created a challenge due to language barrier and 
cultural discord, contrary to the objectives of the contract (MCDSS, 2018). 
     
According to MCDSS (2018), ZAMPOST also completely ignored the role of 
CWACs in the delivery process of the grant and did not allow them to witness 
the payments contrary to the Programme Implementation Manual. Further, 
ZAMPOST workers were always in a hurry to pay, hence leaving out many 
beneficiaries especially the aged and the disabled who usually arrived at pay 
points late. It was also established that these officials were not cooperative 
with other stakeholders including DSWOs and were rude to beneficiaries. In 
Mbula CWAC in Mongu, for instance, ZAMPOST officials kept beneficiaries 
for two days without paying them, at a pay point without conveniences, water 
or food. DSWOs and CWACs were not informed of the payment dates, which 
made it difficult for them to inform the beneficiaries appropriately. Some 
beneficiaries missed the payments as a result.  
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It was also established that, ZAMPOST rarely paid all the beneficiaries from 
pay points as some ineligible people such as village headmen/ women, 
messengers or students were recruited to make payments on its behalf. In some 
instances, beneficiaries were clustered and given lump sums of money to share 
without clear guidelines or supervision. As a result, many beneficiaries ended 
up receiving wrong amounts. To make matters worse, most of the beneficiaries 
signed using thumb prints due to illiteracy, another obvious risk. Table 8 
below, shows how beneficiaries in Mongu assessed the quality of service 
delivery by ZAMPOST as a PSP for social cash transfers. 
 
Table 8: Assessment of the quality of Service by ZAMPOST as a PSP for social 
cash transfers 
How do you find the quality of Social Cash Transfer payments by ZAMPOST? 
  Frequency Percent 
Very impressive 16 26.7 
Fairly impressive 14 23.3 
Not impressive 30 50 
Total 60 100 
 
 From the table above, it is observed that over 50 percent of the beneficiaries 
were not impressed with the quality of Social Cash Transfer payments by 
ZAMPOST.  
Some of the earlier observations about the unsatisfactory performance of 
ZAMPOST were brought to the attention of Management at MCDSS HQ and 
this prompted the then Permanent Secretary Dr. Liya Mutale, to issue a notice 
to terminate the contract with ZAMPOST on payment of SCTs. Barely a few 
hours of issuing the notice, however, in a somewhat melodramatic 
circumstances; the then Minister of Community Development and Social 
Services Emerine Kabanshi, gave a directive to rescind the decision and 
reinstate ZAMPOST as a PSP for the SCT. This situation caused commotion 
and misunderstanding in the Ministry, as well as among donors. A few days 
later, one of the major donors (DFID) was reported as having suspended its 
funding to the Social Cash Transfer programme and in no time at all, President 
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Edgar Lungu fired Emerine Kabanshi, while the Post Master General and his 
six chief officers at ZAMPOST, were suspended pending investigations 
(Zambia Reports, 2018).  
4.5 SWOT Analysis of delivery systems 
This section summarises the comparative findings across three delivery 
systems in Zambia, analysing the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats (SWOT), of the delivery systems as shown in Table 9 below: 
Table 9: SWOT Analysis 
Delivery system STRENGTH WEAKNESS OPPORTUNITY THREAT 
MANUAL (PPMs) Easily accessed by 
beneficiaries 
 
The PPM is a known 
person within pay 
point. 
The PPM gets to know 
most if not all his/her 
clients and their needs 
(vulnerability). 
 
Easy to know who has 
been paid or not 
 
CWACs witness 
payments. 
High risk for theft; 
 
Unpaid funds are 
forfeited to the state. 
 
There is a temptation 
for the clients to 
appreciate the PPM 
through a tip which 
may be abused. 
 
 
 
Pay points are within 
the community in 
which beneficiaries 
live. 
Prone to petty 
corruption 
ELECTRONIC 
(BANK) 
It is more secure and 
generally fast. 
 
Gives the beneficiary 
an opportunity to save; 
if the money is not 
withdrawn it remains 
in the account. 
 
Money can be drawn 
at any time anywhere 
where the visa ATM 
can be used. 
 
Gives beneficiaries 
dignity. 
 
 
The use of pin numbers 
is a big challenge 
among illiterate clients 
and the aged. 
 
No provision for the 
blind/ visually 
impaired to use the 
ATM and visa cards. 
 
ATM cards are not 
produced locally (in 
Zambia) 
 
No tracking system by 
the Ministry to monitor 
unpaid funds. 
The use of ATM cards 
is restricted to clients 
who have national 
High infrastructure 
development in Zambia 
especially (ICT) and 
road network. 
 
Can easily manage 
large scale payments. 
 
Can be prone to fraud 
and abuse 
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registration cards 
(NRC) only, the bank 
does not have an 
alternative for those 
without NRCs 
POST OFFICE Clients can get their 
money from any 
nearest post office. 
 
If the money is not 
withdrawn, it is saved 
and is added up to the 
next bi-monthly, 
allowing the 
beneficiary to 
withdraw an 
accumulated amount. 
 
No witness for 
payments unlike the 
case is with PPMs 
where CWACs witness 
the payments. 
 
No legal backing 
compelling the Post 
Office to submit 
returns to the Ministry 
after payment. 
 
Like the Bank, the 
Ministry does not have 
a credible system of 
tracking the 
unpaid/unclaimed 
funds. 
 
No legal backing 
binding the Post Office 
to pay in designated 
places or specific time 
and dates. 
 
The use of signatures 
and unverified thumb 
prints by illiterate and 
vulnerable clients as 
proof of payment is 
subject to abuse.  
Post Offices, if well 
managed could make 
good pay points. 
 
Prone to fraud and 
abuse. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents key conclusions and recommendations on Government 
policy, Ministerial level strategies and capabilities, delivery mechanisms, 
payment service providers, civil society organisations and donors.   
5.1 Key Messages and Recommendations on Policy. 
5.1.1 Vision and Strategic Planning 
While delivery mechanisms have not been prioritised compared with the actual 
scale up of the SCT programme in Zambia, the Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Services could improve its delivery mechanisms by 
taking advantage of the E-governance system that is being propagated by the 
Government through Smart Zambia and ZICTA. This can either be done by 
zoning the country according to infrastructure and Information Communication 
Technology (ICT) connectivity which should lead to the development of a 
hybrid payment mechanism with easy monitoring and tracking systems of the 
payments, or a system that could use both online and offline payment solution.    
The Ministry should also use the lessons learnt from its current payment 
mechanisms; both the electronic system through ZANACO and the manual 
through PPMs and ZAMPOST to design a more robust payment system that 
will suit the Zambian context, but with improved efficiency and effectiveness. 
All relevant stakeholders should be consulted and allowed to contribute 
towards the development of widely accepted payment strategies and 
mechanisms. Other strategies should be learnt from neighbouring countries 
such as Tanzania and South Africa, with TASAF and SASSA respectively, 
whose experience might help in devising a vision and strategy that is realistic 
and attainable within Zambia’s local context.  
5.1.2 Regulation, Policy and Institutional framework 
Despite the SCT programme having recorded great successes in reducing 
extreme poverty, lack of clear policies and legislation for social protection 
adversely affected programme implementation in the past. With the first ever 
National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) in place; and the Social Protection 
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Bill in the pipeline, MCDSS has a chance to re-organise its implementation 
strategies including delivery mechanisms.  The regulatory environment 
through Bank of Zambia or ZICTA and Smart Zambia, should also be 
conducive enough to allow development of alternative delivery mechanisms. 
There is no doubt that the NSPP has brought renewed impetus on 
strengthening legislative and institutional frameworks to nurture Social 
Protection interventions in the country.  Given that some of the actions needed 
to develop effective delivery systems fall outside the mandate of the Ministry, 
a coordination mechanism is required. This mechanism should bring together 
MCDSS, the Ministry of Finance, Smart Zambia, ZICTA, BOZ, Ministry of 
Transport and Communication, CSOs, the private sector, donors and other 
stakeholders interested in improving social protection delivery systems, to 
review various policies and legislation relevant to the development of Social 
Protection delivery mechanisms and formulate systematic strategies for 
building effective delivery systems particularly for the SCT programme.  
5.1.3 Policy Capability 
It is clear from the discussion above that the Ministry currently has limited 
policy capabilities to design effective and efficient delivery systems for the 
programme. Deliberate and targeted interventions would have to be applied to 
strengthen the Ministry’s capabilities. While broader capacity to upgrading the 
current systems is needed. Priority should, however, be given to re-organising 
the Data Management Information system which should include data cleaning 
and updating of records at the SCT Unit. This will assist in removing ghost 
beneficiaries from the data base and establish the actual number of 
beneficiaries.  
5.1.4 Incentives for Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Lack of motivation and ineffective monitoring and evaluation strategies creates 
impeccable grounds for policy failure. It is obvious that the absence of clear 
performance targets can be a hindrance to effective delivery of social 
protection programmes.  Government should therefore work with other 
relevant stakeholders and put in place performance-based rewards and systems 
with clear outputs. Such systems should have key performance indicators 
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supported by a robust monitoring and evaluation mechanism to track 
effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability in the entire 
administration of the programme. The Ministry should in this regard, 
strengthen its Monitoring and Evaluation unit and ensure that it is able to track 
programme performance on real time and be able to regularly upgrade changes 
in the management information system.                                                         
5.1.5 Leadership and Stakeholder Engagement 
Effective leadership and engagement of stakeholders is of paramount 
importance to any initiative aimed at improving the performance of a system. 
Lack of leadership on the part of the Ministry regarding monitoring and 
evaluation as well as beneficiary data management, negates the efforts of 
building effective delivery systems. Civil Society Organisations, donors 
including the private sector can play a vital role in ensuring that the Ministry 
prioritises monitoring and evaluation of the delivery systems of the 
programme. These stakeholders, therefore, should increase their advocacy, 
resource mobilisation and engaging oversight institutions such as Parliament, 
Smart Zambia and UN Agencies to lobby for improved SCT delivery 
mechanisms. Stakeholders should also establish alliances with the media to 
raise awareness about the importance of quality delivery systems in the SCT 
programme in fighting extreme poverty in the country. 
   
5.1.6 Programme scale-up vs delivery systems 
From the onset, there was lack of prioritisation between rapid scale up and 
improvement of delivery systems of the SCT programme, despite several 
pronouncements by Government about the intension to introduce electronic 
payment systems, no elaborate budgetary allocations were available to show 
commitment other than the increase in the transfer allocation. The only strides 
seen were the engagement of ZAMPOST and ZANACO that seem not to be 
successful either. To support the Ministry in this cause, therefore, stakeholders 
in the sector need to lobby political leadership and high-level technical staff in 
relevant Ministries and Agencies to take ownership and lead the development 
process of an improved social cash transfer delivery system. This should be 
done by streamlining how a robust social protection delivery mechanism 
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addresses aspiration of various stakeholders especially beneficiaries. This has 
the potential to win support and accelerate the implementation of improved 
delivery systems.  It is also important to recognise that PSPs have different 
capabilities, and this affects service delivery. Some PSPs require simple and 
less expensive investment to take off, while others require complex and 
massive investment. Classification and Zoning of locations according to 
infrastructure development is therefore crucial. The Ministry should in this 
regard; work with relevant stakeholders in identifying PSPs and designing 
appropriate delivery systems for the SCT programme.   
5.2 Key conclusions and recommendations on the challenges of 
delivery mechanisms 
From the findings, it can be deduced that delivery strategies and PSP 
capabilities play an important role in ensuring competitiveness and successful 
delivery mechanisms. It is therefore, recommended that any effort to develop a 
delivery mechanism for social grants should, apart from addressing issues of 
capacity to pay, be able to satisfy clients with special needs such as the 
disabled and older persons.  The system should be user friendly particularly to 
the less privileged to enable them to access their money easily, in a safe, timely 
and convenient manner. PSPs should also be able to partner with those of 
unique capabilities whenever need arises. Government and donors should 
provide necessary leadership in this regard.   
5.3 Key Conclusions and Recommendations for Delivery systems 
This section presents key conclusions and recommendations for the delivery 
systems about the efforts aimed at ensuring transparency, convenience, safety 
and reliability of the systems to both Government and beneficiaries. The 
section is structured in such a way that it ties in with the different concerns 
raised in the findings of the study. It covers issues around system 
identification, system development, tendering of service providers, 
consideration for the drivers of engagement and the role of stakeholders.        
5.3.1 Social Cash Transfer implementation and Delivery 
system Development 
The delivery of Zambia’s social cash transfers has predominantly been through 
the Manual Payment System using PPMs. Fiduciary Risk Assessment reports, 
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however, highlighted substantial risk arising from the rapid scale up of the 
programme in the recent past.  Considering that this system involved physical 
carrying of cash from the bank to the pay point, increased caseloads mean high 
risk to corruption and other forms of insecurity. Nonetheless, bearing in mind 
that Zambia is not fully fledged with infrastructure especially in rural areas, it 
is recommended that a hybrid payment solution be designed that would use 
both online and offline technology to be used in rural areas without mobile 
network connectivity. An effective/efficient monitoring and tracking system 
should be developed, supported with improved Management Information 
System that will enable the Ministry to improve its record-keeping and 
reporting especially in the area of beneficiary schedules, PPM conduct and 
disciplinary cases. This will enhance programme administration thereby 
assisting in appreciating the performance of PPMs and PSPs, whether they are 
adhering to programme guidelines or not.  
5.3.2 Payment System Identification and Procurement 
 5.3.2.1 Procurement decision making 
The source of a procurement decision can influence the extent to which a 
system succeeds. ZANACO and ZAMPOST were mostly chosen because the 
duo was either partly or wholly owned by Government and had wider 
coverage in terms of structure and infrastructure.   All things being equal, 
excessive advertising should have allowed for competition in the identification 
of the payment solutions. Due diligence could have also been conducted to 
ascertain the capabilities of the chosen PSPs. This demands transparency and 
incentives for participation of many service providers.   It is in this regard 
recommended that in future extensive advertising be encouraged including 
online advertising to allow for competition when engaging PSPs. Rather than 
the Ministry, such adverts should be managed by institutions such as ZPPA 
and Smart Zambia on behalf of the Ministry; while the Ministry can be 
allowed to generate Terms of References for the PSP to ensure compliance to 
expected outputs.     
5.3.2.4 Drivers of engaging PSPs 
It can be deduced that any effort to engage PSPs will be unsuccessful without 
taking cognisance of the drivers of a successful delivery system. In this regard, 
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there is need to put in place measures that help potential PSPs prove their 
capabilities to accommodate these drivers for expected outputs.   Accordingly, 
it is recommended that a multi-disciplinary steering committee for ensuring 
quality assurance of the delivery systems and providing checks and balances, 
be put in place as part of the process.    
5.3.3 Civil Society (CSO) Developmental Activities and 
Responsibilities 
5.3.3.1 Developmental Activities 
It can be concluded that CSOs are strategically placed in ensuring adherence to 
set standards internationally and locally. CSOs play a key role in sensitizing 
beneficiaries about their expectations; lobbying Government for appropriate 
policies, budgetary allocations including donor support. CSOs complement 
Government’s efforts through direct and indirect implementation of some 
social protection programmes. The Ministry recognises the need for CSOs to 
engage in capacity building of beneficiaries and can thus play an instrumental 
role in the implementation of financial literacy programmes. It is therefore, 
recommended that the efforts to entice CSO participation in the 
implementation of SCT programmes be leveraged through the on-going efforts 
of Government to find appropriate payment solutions to the SCT programme.  
5.4 Key Conclusions and Recommendations for Donors 
It is concluded that donors can play a vital role in the development of effective 
and efficient social cash transfer delivery systems including record keeping, 
monitoring and tracking the payments. Their role can be broad based.  
It is therefore recommended that donors should support the restructuring of the 
SCT Unit  through provision of expertise, supporting capacity  needs 
assessment for areas of improvement, baseline surveys, provide technical 
expertise in setting up the payment tracking system, providing financial 
resources  for procurement of necessary equipment, capacity building of staff 
through training and  setting up monitoring and evaluation structures at various 
levels, facilitating and supporting experience-sharing and learning;  providing 
evidence through studies and policy briefs to help shape the social protection 
policy and other policy frameworks and ensure conformity to poverty 
89 
 
reduction strategies.  Beyond this, it is recommended that donors should play 
the role of convener to assemble stakeholders, bearing in mind that such 
efforts require a wider sector approach to be successful. Donors should also 
ensure co-ownership of the process by all stakeholders and avoid boo-dosing 
rather than facilitating the process.     
6.0 CONCLUSION 
 
This research has highlighted modalities in which Zambia has been delivering 
its social grants and shared experiences through which lessons can be learnt.  It 
has also provided an in-depth analysis of government policy, Ministry level 
capabilities and strategies, civil society as well as donor engagement; stressing 
how various players can influence programme implementation and affect 
delivery system development. The research has further made recommendations 
that can help shape reforms aimed at improving the quality of social cash 
transfer delivery through capacity building of the Ministry and its structures.   
The researcher’s work and findings establish that effective delivery of social 
grants, offers opportunities to promote financial inclusion of the extreme poor 
and vulnerable groups once appropriate delivery mechanisms are in place. 
Seizing these opportunities, however, requires alignment of policies, strategies 
and actions of multiple stakeholders including government, the private sector, 
CSOs and donors towards effective delivery of the social grants to the poor. 
This in a way responds to the research question by the researcher: “How have 
Social Grants in Zambia been paid and what lessons can be learnt from this?” 
7.0 RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Having identified factors influencing Zambia’s social grants payment 
mechanisms over the years, this research also makes recommendations that 
can be considered in the designing of successful delivery mechanisms of social 
cash transfers. Considering that these efforts exist in a dynamic political 
landscape where there are several stakeholders with bestowed interests, a 
broader study on political influence on social cash transfer delivery 
mechanisms can no doubt be a worthwhile supplement to this research.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
NELSON MANDELA SCHOOL OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
RE: REQUEST FOR CONSENT TO BE A RESEARCH RESPONDENT 
 
I am a student at the University of Cape Town, pursuing a Master of Philosophy in Development Policy and 
Practice (MPHIL), degree course. I am hereby requesting for your consent to be one of my respondents to my 
research on the “payment systems of the social cash transfer programme in Zambia. “This will help me come up 
with information regarding the general performance of the social cash transfer delivery systems currently being 
used in Zambia. 
Be assured that the information you will share with me will be confidential and will only be used for academic 
purposes. 
Your consent to this request will be greatly appreciated. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
………………………………………… (SIGN) 
Henry Nkhoma- Researcher/Student 
Consent by Respondent 
Having read or head the information concerning this research, I hereby voluntarily consent t be one of the 
respondents. In this regard, I reserve the right to end the interview at any time and choose not to answer 
questions if necessary, 
 
Name: ………………………………………. (SIGN): …………………………… 
Date: ………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 2 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS/PPMs and CWACs 
AS KEY INFORMANTS 
 
Date: ………………………………. 
 
Position: …………………………. 
Address: …………………………………………………………………… 
1) When did the social cash Transfer begin in Zambia/in the CWAC? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2) Who qualifies for the Social Cash transfers? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3) How much are they given? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………….... 
4) How often are they given the money? 
..........................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................... 
5) Who makes the payments? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
6) How is the suitability of a delivery system determined? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
7) How effective are the delivery systems used? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
8) How accessible are the delivery Systems to the beneficiaries? 
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..........................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................... 
9) What challenges are faced by the delivery systems in making cash transfer payments? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
10) What are the challenges faced by the beneficiaries regarding payment of the 
Transfers? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
11) How are these challenges addressed? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 3 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR BENEFICIARIES OF THE SOCIAL CASH TRANSFER 
SCHEME 
 
Address: …………………………………………………………………… 
 
1. Date: ………………………………... 
2. Vulnerability category: ………………… (a) Aged (b) Disabled (c) chronically ill       
(d) Female headed (e) Child headed 
3. Age: ..................... (a) 15-24 years (b) 25 -34 years (c) 35-44 years (d) 45-54 (e) 55-64 (f) 
above 65 years 
4. Gender: (a) Male              (b) Female  
5. For how long have you been on the social cash transfer programme? 
1. (a) Less than 2 years (b) 2-5 years (c) Over 5 years  
6. How much do you receive?  (a) K180 (b) K280 (c) K360 (d) Other, specify. 
7. How often do you get paid?  
a) Every month, 
b) Bi-monthly 
c) I don’t know 
d) Other, specify ………………………... 
8. How do you know that it is time to get paid? 
a) I am informed by CWAC (b) I am informed by the District Office (c) I am informed 
by neighbours (d) Other, specify …………………………………………………... 
9. Where do you receive your money from? 
a) Pay point manager (b) Bank (ZANACO) (c) Post Office (ZAMPOST) (d) other, 
specify…………………………………... 
10. How did you find yourself being paid by the one who pays you? 
a) I decided on my own (b) I was told by the District social Welfare Office (c) I was told by 
the CWAC (d) Other specify 
11. How do you get to the pay point? 
a) I walk (b) by bicycle (c) Lift/commuter (d) Other specify 
12. How long does it take you to the pay point? 
a) Less than 30 (b) between 30minutes to 1-hour (c) More than 1-hour (d) other specify 
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13. Do you always receive all the money you expect to receive? 
a) Yes (b) No (c) Sometimes (d) I don’t know 
14. Who collects the money for you?  (1) Self (b) Deputy (c) Other – explain. 
15. How do you know that you have collected the correct amount? 
a) I count it (b) they count for me (c) I don’t know  
16. What do you do to show that you have collected the money? 
a) I sign (b) I use a thumb print (c) they sign for me (d) Nothing 
17. What challenges do you face when collecting your money? 
a) The pay point is far (b) Delayed payments (c) the pay officers are rude (d) Nothing 
18. How do you rate the payment system used in paying you the transfers? 
a) It is fair 
b) It is good 
c) Bad 
19. Why did you say what you said in 18 above? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
20. What do you think should be done to improve the payment system and why? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 4 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PAYMENT INSTITUTION 
This interview guide is purely for academic purposes, it is prepared as part of the 
requirements of attainment of the Master of Philosophy in Development Policy 
and Practice Degree, at the University of Cape Town. 
MANDELA SCHOOL OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE, SOUTH AFRICA. 
Date: ……………………….................. Age: .......................................... 
Gender: ..................................................................................................... 
Position of respondent: ……………………………………………………. 
Address: …………………………………………………………………… 
E-mail address: ……………………………………………………………. 
1. When were you engaged as a payment institution for the social cash transfer scheme 
by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. What were the terms of references for your services to the Ministry? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. When did you start paying the social cash transfers? (Year). 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………….... 
4. What is the total caseload of the beneficiaries are you supposed to pay? 
..........................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................... 
5. How many beneficiaries are you paying as at now? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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6. If the numbers are different above, what is the reason for the difference? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
7. What are some of the challenges you are facing in the payment process as a service 
provider? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
8. How are you addressing the challenges? 
..........................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................... 
9. What system are you using in making cash transfer payments? 
(a) Manual 
(b) Electronic (use of ATMs) 
(c) Both 
10. What challenges are faced by the beneficiaries in using your payment system? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
11. How are these challenges addressed? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
12. When do you intend to scale up your payment system to other 
provinces?………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………..
....................................................................................................................... 
13. What are the challenges for scaling up your payment system to other parts of the 
country?............................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................... 
14. In general terms, how can the payment system of the social cash transfer scheme be 
improved in Zambia? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 5 Beneficiary Caseload by District– 2018 
PROVINCE DISTRICT 
DISTRICT 
CASELOAD 
PROVINCIAL 
TOTAL 
EXTREME POOR 
RATE 
PROVINCIAL 
(%) 
WESTERN 
Kalabo 10,828 
71,032 73 
Sikongo 3,921 
Kaoma 5,630 
Luampa 2,410 
Nkeyema 3,082 
Lukulu 4,607 
Mitete 2,455 
Limulunga 2,960 
Mongu 5,782 
Nalolo 5,429 
Senanga 5,266 
Mulobezi 2,819 
Mwandi 1,713 
Sesheke 3,296 
Shangombo 7,336 
Sioma 3,498 
CENTRAL 
Chibombo 5,374 
39,867 39.8 
Chisamba 3,889 
Kabwe 2,512 
Kapirimposhi 6,359 
Ngabwe 1,474 
Luano 2,176 
Mkushi 3,752 
Mumbwa 3,618 
Chitambo 4,607 
Serenje 6,106 
COPPERBELT 
Chililabombwe 2,255 
 
 
 
 
45,797 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
18.2 
Chingola 4,685 
Kalulushi 2,118 
Kitwe 8,252 
Luanshya 3,708 
Lufwanyama 5,812 
Masaiti 3,098 
Mpongwe 4,973 
Mufulira 3,320 
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Ndola 7,576 
EASTERN 
Chadiza 3,909  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69,608  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
55.9 
Vubwi 1,690 
Chipata 15,535 
Katete 8,846 
Sinda 7,581 
Lundazi 11,087 
Mambwe 5,528 
Nyimba 5,327 
Petauke 10,105 
LUAPULA 
Chienge 8,212 
95,372 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
67.7 
Kawambwa 9,912 
Mwansabombwe 4,523 
Chembe 3,007 
Mansa 11,655 
Milenge 6,943 
Chipili 4,295 
Mwense 11,740 
Nchelenge 10,845 
Lunga 5,846 
Samfya 18,394 
LUSAKA 
Chongwe 7,772 
32,956 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
11 Rufunsa 2,607 
Kafue 3,541 
Luangwa 2,371 
Lusaka 11,318 
Chilanga 2,472 
Shibuyunji 2,855 
MUCHINGA 
Chama 4,252 
41,396 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
54.4 
Chinsali 5,396 
Shiwangandu 5,191 
Isoka 4,703 
Mafinga 5,379 
Kanchibiya 3,901 
Lavushimanda 2,581 
Mpika 4,114 
Nakonde 5,879 
NORTHERN Chilubi 6,393 71424  
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Kaputa 7,001   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
67.6 
Nsama 6,622 
kasama 7,624 
Luwingu 10311 
Mbala 4919 
Senga Hill 4921 
Lunte 2488 
Mporokoso 2020 
Mpulungu 7162 
Mungwi 11963 
NORTH-
WESTERN 
Chavuma 3059 
36,921 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
48.4 
Ikelenge 1934 
Kabompo 3021 
Manyinga 3016 
Kasempa 3373 
Mufumbwe 4337 
Mwinulunga 3742 
Kalumbila 2569 
Mushindamo 1335 
Solwezi 2060 
Zambezi 8475 
SOUTHERN 
Choma 5943 
70,290 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
38.1 Pemba 3622 
Gwembe 3639 
Itezhi-tezhi 4697 
Kalomo 9042 
Zimba 5053 
Kazungula 4693 
Livingstone 2379 
Chikankata 4078 
Mazabuka 5349 
Monze 7874 
Namwala 4457 
Chirundu 2980 
Siavonga 1654 
Sinazongwe 4830 
NATIONAL 
CASELOAD: 
 574, 663   
Source: MCDSS, Dashboard (print date: 14-May-18) 
Other appendices removed to avoid exposing signatures of participants and other officials online
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Glossary 
Agent: An institution, usually an investment bank that accepts 
funds from the issuer of a security and distributes them 
to the beneficiary or account holders. 
Biometric: Any means by which a person can be uniquely identified 
by evaluating one or more distinguishing biological 
traits. Unique identifiers include fingerprints, hand 
geometry, earlobe geometry, retina and iris patterns, 
voice waves, DNA, and signatures. 
Deputy: Proxy or someone who takes the role of the other. In 
social cash transfers, a person who receives payments 
on behalf of the other or deputises 
Electronic payment (E-payment): A way of making transactions or paying for goods and 
services through an electronic medium without the use 
of check or cash. It's also called an electronic payment 
system or online payment system. 
Financial Inclusion: where individuals and businesses have access to useful 
and affordable financial products and services that meet 
their needs – transactions, payments, savings, credit 
and insurance – delivered in a responsible and 
sustainable way. 
Incapacitated households: Those households with no one fit to work or without any 
adult fit to work and have a high dependency ratio 
making it virtually impossible to maintain the 
household. 
Management Information: 
System (MIS): A computerized database of financial information 
organized and programmed in such a way that it 
produces regular reports on operations for every level 
of management in a company. 
Mobile banking: A service provided by a bank or other financial 
institution that allows its customers to conduct financial 
transactions remotely using a mobile phone. 
Mobile Money: An electronic wallet service. This is available in many 
countries and allows users to store, send, and receive 
money using their mobile phone. 
Over the counter transactions (OTC): Trading done directly between two parties, without 
counterparty risk (In a Bank over the till). 
Payment delivery Mechanism: The way that health purchasers pay health care 
providers to deliver services is a critical element of 
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strategic purchasing. Each payment system is based on 
one or more provider payment methods or mechanisms. 
Payment Service Provider: Online services for accepting electronic payments by a 
variety of payment methods including credit card, bank-
based payments such as direct debit, bank transfer, and 
real-time bank transfer based on online banking. 
Personal Identification Number (PIN): A Personal Identification Number, pronounced 
"pin"; (often spoken out loud "PIN number", 
introducing redundancy) is a numeric or alpha-
numeric password used in the process of authenticating 
a user accessing a system. 
Point of sale (POS) device: The point of sale (POS) system is the place where your 
customer executes the payment for goods or services 
bought from your company. 
Proxy:     A person authorized to act on behalf of someone else. 
Recipient:    A person who receives it (cash transfers beneficiaries). 
Smart card: A card with a microchip in it. Such cards are used as a 
method of identification and authentication. Plastic 
cards that allow to take out money from a automated 
teller machine (ATM) often are smart cards nowadays 
(Some of them still have a magnetic stripe which holds 
the same information). 
Social Protection (SP):   Policies and practices that protect and promote the 
livelihoods and welfare of people suffering from critical 
levels of poverty and deprivation and/or are vulnerable 
to risks and shocks (FNDP 2006 p.160).   
 
 
 
 
